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Evidence and Economic Theory
Deborah M. Weisst
"[W]e can't always have what we want. Sometimes we have to
have what's good for us."'
Margaret Thatcher
Left to their own devices, many people will not save enough
for their old age. This hard truth about human behavior has led
American government to make a long and expensive commitment
to retirement security programs. Indeed, Congress has made retire-
ment security the most expensive commitment on the American
public policy agenda. Of the two main components of this policy,
one, Social Security, is by far the most costly domestic program.
The other, the system of tax subsidies to employer pensions, is the
federal government's largest tax expenditure.' With the great ex-
penditures on these programs, Congress has set out to guarantee
that even the most profligate young worker will have something to
retire on.
These massive programs, however, have not entirely achieved
their goal. As a host of critics have pointed out, pension coverage
remains distressingly spotty and inequitable.3 The highest subsi-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University. Previous drafts of this Article have
received more kind attention than they deserved from Janet Cooper Alexander, Joe Bank-
man, Bill Baxter, Richard Craswell, Barbara Fried, Ron Gilson, Mark Kelman, Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bob Mnookin, Mitch Polinsky, Roberta Romano, Susan Rose-Ackerman, David
Rosenhan, Bill Simon, Cass Sunstein, and James Whitman.
I Quoted in Bernadine Morris, British Fashion Rises and Shines, NY Times B14 (Mar
20, 1984).
2 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991, H Doc 101-122, 101st
Cong, 2d Sess A-737 (GPO, 1990). See notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondis-
crimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 Tax L Rev 435, 501 (1987);
Michael Boskin and John B. Shoven, Concepts and Measures of Earning Replacement
During Retirement, 1987 Issues in Pension Econ 113, 125; Martin Feldstein, The Social
Security Explosion, 81 Pub Interest 94, 104-05 (1985); Michael J. Boskin, Too Many
Promises: The Uncertain Future of Social Security 2-3, 102-04 (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1986);
Michael Boskin and John B. Shoven, Poverty Among the Elderly: Where Are the Holes in
the Safety Net?, in Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise, Pensions in the U.S.
Economy (Chicago, 1988); Richard B. Freeman, Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension
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dies are paid to affluent consumers who need pensions the least,
while those most in need often have no pension coverage at all.
More than a half century of effort since the New Deal seems to
have achieved only limited success, and reform proposals abound.4
They abound, in particular, among economists. Some of the
nation's most prominent economists have tried their hands at re-
fashioning American pension policy.' Yet policymakers have gener-
ally ignored the economists' recommendations. There is, of course,
nothing unusual in this: Policymakers often have little use for pol-
icy-thinkers. Nevertheless, it is particularly unsurprising that
policymakers should ignore the recommendations of economists in
the pension arena, for pension policy is paternalistic, and paternal-
ism is something economists have a great deal of difficulty
understanding.
Paternalism presumes that people are unable to understand
their own best interest and require the protection of a benevolent
state. In the pension context, paternalism supposes that young
people may not save enough unless forced or encouraged to do
so-supposes, that is, the hard truth with which I began: that
many people, left to their own devices, will not save enough for
their old age. Such paternalistic concerns are difficult to reconcile
with the assumptions that underlie economic analysis, for econo-
mists presume that, each individual knows what is best for himself.
Individuals, economists assume, rationally examine the opportuni-
ties available to them, and choose the one they value most highly.
This conception of rational choice suggests that individual choices
maximize individual welfare, a conclusion known as consumer soV-
Funds, in David A. Wise, Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice 89, 98-99 (Chicago, 1985).
See notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
4 Richard A. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy 207 (Dow Jones-Irwin,
1986); Richard A. Ippolito, Pensions and Economics: Towards an Efficient Retirement Pol-
icy, in Jack L. VanDerhei, ed, Search for a National Retirement Income Policy 33, 35-37
(Pension Research Council, 1987); HR Rep No 3972, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, §§ 201, 202 (Feb
12, 1990); S 1682, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (Sep 27, 1989), in 135 Cong Rec S12010 (daily ed, Sep
27, 1989) (housing and education proposal); Paul A. Samuelson, Optimal Social Security in
a Life-Cycle Growth Model, 26 Intl Econ Rev 539 (1975); Boskin, Too Many Promises at
100 (cited in note 3); S 2026, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 25, 1990), in 136 Cong Rec S 412 (Jan
25, 1990) (Symms); HR 3083, § 2, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (Aug 2, 1989), in 135 Cong Rec
H4946 (Aug 2, 1989) (Porter); David Boaz, Privatize Social Security, NY Times A27 (Mar
21, 1990); Anthony E. Scoville, Security for Social Security, NY Times A23 (Jul 23, 1982);
Altman, 42 Tax L Rev at 456-500 (cited in note 3); Emily S. Andrews, The Changing Profile
of Pensions in America 165-69 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1985); Michael J.
Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U Pa L Rev
851, 906-08 (1987). See notes 53-67, 83-88 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Boskin, Too Many Promises at 100-04 (cited in note 3).
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ereignty. With such assumptions, economists find it difficult to ex-
plain what it means for a household to have saved too little: the
analytic framework of economics implies that no paternalistic in-
tervention can improve on the household's own actions. How then
can economists hope to advise Congress on this most paternalistic
of policies?
To be sure, some economists have been reluctant to endorse
the conclusion that all individuals make the best possible savings
decisions.' But even with the best intentions, they have had diffi-
culty modifying the economic model to explain how or why indi-
viduals make a less-than-ideal choice. Even those economists who
are in principle willing to abandon their ingrained theoretical at-
tachment to the assumptions of the economic theory of human be-
havior cannot do so without an analytic alternative. They need to
show that individuals make mistakes and, more significantly, that
those mistakes can be analyzed. They need to show that individu-
als err systematically in ways that can be exploited by paternalistic
policymakers.
The purpose of this Article is to show that individuals do err
systematically, and that an analytic paternalistic pension policy
can be founded on the phenomenon of time inconsistency.7 There
is a growing body of empirical evidence, gathered primarily by psy-
chologists, that suggests that over time consumer choice is not al-
ways consistent.8 This evidence of inconsistency offers a founda-
See notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Guillermo Calvo, Some Notes on Time Inconsistency and Rawls'
Maximin Criterion, 45 Rev Econ Stud 97 (1978).
' Douglas J. Navarick, Negative Reinforcement and Choice in Humans, 13 Learning
and Motivation 361 (1982); Jay V. Solnick, et al, An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity
and Impulse Control in Humans, 11 Learning and Motivation 61 (1980); Andrew Millar and
Douglas J. Navarick, Self-Control and Choice in Humans: Effects of Video Game Playing
as a Positive Reinforcer, 15 Learning and Motivation 203 (1984); George Ainslie and Varda
Haendel, The Motives of the Will, in Edward Gottheil, et al, eds, Etiologic Aspects of Drug
and Alcohol Abuse 119 (Charles C. Thomas, 1983); Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport, and Jo-
seph Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 Mgmt Sci
270 (1989); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ
Letters 201 (1981); George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness
and Impulse Control, 82 Psych Bull 463 (1975); A. W. Logue, Research on Self-Control: An
Integrating Framework, 11 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 665 (1988); Howard Rachlin and
Leonard Green, Commitment, Choice and Self-Control, 17 J Exprmtl Analysis Behavior 15
(1972); Walter Mischel, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Antonette R. Zeiss, Cognitive and Atten-
tional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification, 21 J Personality and Soc Psych 204 (1972);
George F. Loewenstein, Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice, 34 Mgmt Sci 200 (1988).
Attempts at theoretical analysis include George F. Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valu-
ation of Delayed Consumption, 97 Econ J 666 (1987); Thomas Schelling, The Intimate
Contest for Self-Command, in Thomas Schelling, Choice and Consequence 57 (Harvard,
1984). See notes 103-05, 117-19 and accompanying text.
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tion for a methodical analysis of paternalistic savings policies, an
analysis that will aid in the creation of more satisfactory retire-
ment security programs. Drawing on this psychological evidence,
then, I argue that an understanding of the mechanism by which
consumer sovereignty breaks down can help in designing a cost ef-
fective paternalistic pension policy. In particular, this Article will
identify two different types of breakdowns in consumer sover-
eignty. On the one hand, preference change may result from the
mere passage of time; on the other hand, preferences may change
because of features of the situation in which the individual finds
himself.
An individual whose preferences change over time is in many
respects like a rational consumer: he makes decisions on the mar-
gin, and although his choices do not always produce optimal re-
sults, they can be manipulated with conventional economic tools
such as tax subsidies. In contrast, the behavior of an individual
whose preferences change from situation to situation does not con-
form to the fundamental economic principle of marginalism. That
behavior cannot be systematically changed by marginal subsidies.
Instead, such an individual can be induced to save by various tech-
niques that would have no effect on rational agents or on individu-
als with time-dependent preference change. Finally, individuals
with either type of preference change have one trait in common:
the savings of both groups can be manipulated by precommitment
devices which would not affect the behavior of rational individuals.
Section I of this Article examines how current American law
implements paternalistic pension policy. Section II evaluates the
methodological obstacles to applying standard economic savings
theory to paternalistic policy. It also describes neoclassical argu-
ments that justify a certain degree of state interventionism but do
not adequately explain the need for paternalism. Section III exam-
ines non-neoclassical criticisms of the pension system. I argue that
these criticisms make important points but fail to show any behav-
ioral basis for formulating a paternalistic pension policy. Section
IV examines a modified neoclassical theory. I argue that this ap-
proach fails to resolve the fundamental methodological puzzle that
prevents the application of neoclassical methods to paternalistic
policy. Section V turns to experimental psychology. This section
details the empirical evidence of inconsistency in choice over time.
It then explores the two most likely causes of this inconsis-
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tency-time-inconsistent preferences and situational preference
change-and argues that the existence of either type of preference
change justifies, in some instances, paternalistic policy interven-
tion. Section VI examines the implications of inconsistent prefer-
ences for the choice among policy tools and offers concrete
proposals.
I. AMERICA'S PATERNALISTIC SAVINGS POLICY
Paternalism has long been held in disrepute, and overt admis-
sions of paternalistic policy goals are seldom heard in the public
arena. Nevertheless, everyone who is subject to Social Security
withholding knows that America has a policy of forced savings and
must suspect that that policy has a paternalistic objective. A close
examination of the design of the present regime of pension policies
shows that regime is deeply molded by paternalistic concerns.
The United States attempts to provide retirement income se-
curity through two programs: Social Security and the system of tax
subsidies for retirement savings. Both of these mechanisms display
Congress's desire to protect people from the consequences of their
own actions by restricting individual choice.
The design of Social Security most clearly shows Congress's
preference for policies that raise savings through restrictions on in-
dividual choice. Social Security comprises about fifty-four percent
of the average household's post-retirement income." With 1991 So-
cial Security payments estimated to be $235 billion,10 it is by far
the most expensive domestic program. Participation in Social Se-
curity is compulsory. Thus, for the individual contributor, the So-
cial Security system is just like forced savings: individuals are re-
quired to give up consumption now in return for more
consumption later."
' Boskin and Shoven, 1987 Issues in Pension Econ at 124 (cited in note 3).
10 Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1991 at A-737 (cited in note 2).
1 From a public perspective, Social Security is not a form of savings. If Social Security
payroll taxes were invested in a trust fund, the trust would contribute to national savings.
The trust would loan invested funds for use as capital investment. As individuals retired,
the government would finance their Social Security checks from the return on the fund, or
through partial liquidation of the fund. If the present workforce made no further contribu-
tions, the trust would pay at least partial annuities from the return on the trust fund invest-
ments. Instead, under the present unfunded system, the Social Security administration pays
out the proceeds of the payroll tax to current retirees rather than investing them. In general,
if tax payments were to cease, annuities would also. (This is subject to a qualification: The
fund at present runs a temporary surplus because of the large size of the current working
cohort.) Social Security is therefore not a form of savings, since at present the trust funds
are not invested in the capital stock. Feldstein, The Social Security Explosion, 81 Pub In-
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Though Social Security is the most obviously paternalistic
program, it is by no means the only one. The system of tax incen-
tives also has a paternalistic character, though of a more subtle
kind. Unlike Social Security, the tax system does not require indi-
viduals to save. Rather, it encourages savings through subsidies.
But existing subsidies are intended to serve a paternalistic objec-
tive. As we will see shortly, the Internal Revenue Code provides
the highest ceilings on tax deductions to those pension programs
that leave the least room for individual choice regarding savings
levels.
The system of tax incentives breaks down into two basic pro-
grams: subsidization of employer-sponsored plans12 and subsidiza-
tion of Individual Retirement Accounts.' 3 This tax-incentive sys-
tem is more limited than Social Security, with private pensions
accounting for fifteen percent of average post-retirement income.'4
Still, it is far from negligible: the tax exemption for employer-
sponsored pensions is the largest single tax preference in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, costing an estimated $46.9 billion in lost reve-
nues in 1991.11 Like Social Security, this costly system disfavors
individual choice. It gives the most generous deductions to non-
elective employer-sponsored pension plans, in which the employee
is not permitted to choose between wages and pension contribu-
tions.'" Such non-elective plans must cover all members of a prede-
termined group-individual employees of participating employers
are forced to contribute to their own retirement savings. Non-elec-
tive plans receive very favorable tax treatment. Both the employer
contributions and the subsequent interest on these contributions
are deductible, and these deductions can be taken on contributions
terest at 104-05 (cited in note 3); Boskin, Too Many Promises at 7-11 (cited in note 3);
Martin Feldstein, Social Security and Saving: The Extended Life Cycle Theory, 66(2)
Amer Econ Rev 77, 85 (1976).
12 Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 USC § 401(a) (1991).
11 IRC § 408. Keogh plans, which are for self-employed individuals, belong in some
sense to both types.
14 Boskin and Shoven, 1987 Issues in Pension Econ at 124 (cited in note 3).
15 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991 at A-73 (cited in note 2).
For 1991, the Office of Management and Budget projects that tax preferences for IRAs and
Keoghs will cost the treasury $6.2 and $1.6 billion respectively. Id.
16 IRC §§ 404(a)(1), 404(a)(2), 404(a)(3) (employer deduction); IRC § 402(a)(1) (em-
ployee); IRC §§ 501(a), 501(c)(24). In the absence of such provisions, employer contributions
to such plans, would, under usual tax principles, constitute a deductible business expense
for the employer, and current income to the employee; the appreciation on any investment
would be taxable as it accrued.
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of up to $30,000 per year" or until a pension annuity of $90,000
per year is reached.18
The contrast with voluntary employee contributions to em-
ployer-sponsored plans is striking. Congress is far less generous in
subsidizing voluntary contributions. Such contributions may take
either of two forms, both of which receive a smaller subsidy than
that accorded to non-elective plans. First, some voluntary contri-
butions supplement employer contributions to the main plan. Indi-
viduals can only make these contributions from after-tax wage in-
come-substantially disfavored treatment.'9 Second, the "cash or
deferred arrangement" (CODA) permits employees to enter into a
voluntary salary reduction agreement with employers by which the
employer reduces their salaries in return for higher employer pen-
sion contributions. 20 Like voluntary contributions, CODAs receive
a more limited subsidy than do non-elective plans. Although taxes
on both contributions and interest are deferred, the ceiling on al-
lowable annual contributions for CODAs is $7,000, substantially
lower than the ceiling for non-elective plans.2'
Finally, Congress's decision to disfavor individual choice shows
in its treatment of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). The
lowest ceilings of all apply to contributions to IRAs, a type of plan
wholly unrelated to employment. Eligible persons may deduct con-
tributions to IRAs, 22 but only up to $2000 per year.2 Additionally,
IRAs are generally not available to individuals covered by em-
ployer pensions.2 4 Congress is thus most generous to those forms of
retirement savings that leave the least room for individual choice.
17 Contributions to a defined plan generally cannot exceed the lesser of $30,000 or 25%
of the participant's compensation. IRC §§ 415(c)(1)(A), 415(c)(1)(B).
1S A defined benefit plan cannot provide benefits greater than the lesser of $90,000 or
100% of the individual's average salary for his three highest paid years. IRC §§ 415
(b)(1)(A), 415(b)(1)(B). By combining defined contribution and defined benefit plans, an
individual can generally accrue more pension wealth than by using either alone, although it
is not possible to deduct the full amounts permitted by either type of plan alone. IRC
§ 415(e).
" The appreciation, though, is untaxed. IRC § 402(a)(1).
20 Id.
21 IRC § 402(g)(1). The Code defers taxes on both contributions and interest. An em-
ployee may make this election at any time permitted by the plan, but may only elect to
contribute amounts not yet received as compensation. Treas Reg §§ 1.401(k)-(3)(i), 1.401(k)-
(3)(ii). A one-time irrevocable election at the time that eligibility begins is permitted. The
tax on both contributions and appreciation is deferred for contributions by self-employed
individuals to Keogh plans. IRC §§ 401(c)(1), 401(c)(4).
SIR § 219(a).
23 IRC § 219(b)(1)(A). The amount allowable as a deduction is limited to the lesser of
$2,000 or an amount equal to the compensation an individual may include in gross income
for such taxable year. Id.
2- IRC § 219(g).
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Nor does the matter end with the contribution rules. Federal
law subjects retirement assets to special restrictions and protec-
tions. For example, the Internal Revenue Code subjects withdraw-
als from subsidized retirement savings plans to income tax, and
imposes a penalty of ten percent on most such withdrawals.25 Con-
gress also subjects the most highly subsidized retirement savings to
even further restrictions. Prior to retirement, individuals can only
withdraw pension assets from an employer-sponsored fund in the
event of separation from service. 6 Yet, individuals can withdraw
CODA holdings upon separation and also in the event of hard-
ship,27 while IRA funds can be withdrawn at any time for any rea-
son. Congress also accords pensions special protections, designed to
prevent individuals from reaching old age pensionless. In general,
individuals cannot assign or alienate pension wealth,2 and pen-
sions enjoy a partial exemption from attachment by creditors.2"
This system of ceilings and restrictions suggests that the pres-
ent system of retirement income security has a strong paternalistic
coloration. 0 I must emphasize the conception of human behavior
25 IRC § 72(t)(1).
26 Rev Rul 56-693, 1956-2 Cum Bull 282, as modified by Rev Rul 60-323, 1960-2 Cur
Bull 148; Rev Rul 74-254, 1974-1 Cum Bull 91 (1974). Former Secretary of Labor Elizabeth
Dole indicated that she was considering legislation eliminating even this exception by re-
quiring rollover of pension benefits in the event of job separation. Labor Secretary Seeks to
Require Workers to Save, NY Times A20 (May 17, 1990).
27 IRC § 401(k)(2)(B)(i).
28 Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 USC § 1056 (d)(1) (1974);
IRC § 401(a)(13).
29 Mackey v Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 US 825, 837 (1988) (dic-
tum); General Motors Corp. v Buha, 623 F2d 455, 463 (6th Cir 1980). Under some circum-
stances, debtors can exclude pensions from an estate in bankruptcy, particularly if the pen-
sion assets are not under the present control of the debtor. In general, therefore, Keogh
plans and IRAs are not excluded from the estate. See, for example, Matter of Goff, 706 F2d
574, 588 (5th Cir 1983); Education Assistance Corp. v Zellner, 827 F2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir
1987). Employer-sponsored pensions are more likely to be held exempt if the debtor has no
power to withdraw the funds prior to retirement or disability. Compare Matter of Watkins,
95 Bank 483 (W D Mich 1988) (employee prohibited from alienating his interest in a pen-
sion plan which thus qualifies as a spendthrift trust under state law, and is exempt from the
estate), with In re Strehlow, 84 Bankr 241 (Bankr S D Fla 1988) (debtor's ownership of
employer corporation and co-trusteeship of plan defeated exemption). But see In re Gra-
ham, 726 F2d 1268, 1271-74 (8th Cir 1984) (pension plans never exempt).
3' Indeed, a non-paternalistic policy would look very different. In a system of elective
individual plans, each employee's pension wealth would depend on the employer's view of
the net marginal benefit to it of additional employee pension wealth. The employer would
determine the marginal benefit by evaluating such factors as the employee's willingness to
accept wage offsets for pension benefits; the tax benefit attributable to contributions on
behalf of the individual employee; and any other advantages or costs associated with pen-
sion provisions. But with a group plan, employers must measure the marginal costs and
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that underlies this sort of paternalism. Congress clearly supposes
that people are unable to make wise savings decisions for them-
selves. Congress thus presumably favors nonelective plans because
it believes that incentives will not adequately encourage savings.
Congress accordingly directs employers to include individuals in
pension plans who would have chosen not to participate were the
decision left to them. Similarly, Congress seems determined,
through its system of restrictions on, and protections of, retirement
assets, to make certain that individuals will not dissipate their
savings.
To say that Congress has designed a paternalistic system is
not, however, to say that Congress has designed that system well.
On the contrary, the system is deeply flawed. Some of those flaws
are simply design glitches,"' but some flaws are more deep-seated.
In particular, it is hard to justify the pattern of coverage that has
resulted from the existing system. Our current reliance on incen-
tives to employers to provide pensions creates coverage gaps
among groups of workers with short employment histories and
among those who work for firms which are poorly situated to pro-
vide pensions. Only about half of the work force at any given time
is covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan and only about
two-thirds will ultimately receive pension benefits.2 Even though
many of those with low pension wealth will succeed in providing
benefits of increased coverage with respect to the group of covered employees as a whole,
not with respect to the individual employee, since coverage to one cannot be increased with-
out increasing coverage to all. Thus, there will be many individuals in the group whose
pension accumulation will exceed (or be less than) the level they would have chosen under a
CODA or other plan that allowed them to choose the level of subsidized savings on their
own. If consumers save rationally this is an unfortunate result. But if they save too little it
is highly desirable. High savers can achieve their preferred level of savings with other assets;
low savers will be forced, apparently by paternalistic design, to save more than they might
like.
,, For example, the penalty tax of 10% on withdrawals from subsidized accounts estab-
lished by IRC § 72(t) is not well designed. The tax does not always impose a penalty and at
times fails to recapture the tax benefits received. Suppose a taxpayer receives one dollar of
income. If he simply invests it in a taxable savings vehicle, he has, after t years, the amount
where 4 tax rate and r=interest rate. If he instead places it in a pension fund and with-
draws it after t years, incurring the 10% withdrawal penalty, he has
.9(1-$)(1 +r)t
The tax advantages of deferral increase with t; the penalty rate does not. In the early years,
the penalty more than outweighs the tax preference; in the later years it is lower. For 0=.30
and r=.10, the crossover point is reached at about 3.8 years.
" See, for example, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Daniel E. Smith, Pensions in the Ameri-
can Economy 29, 69 (Chicago, 1983). Ultimate rates of pension receipt are extrapolated
from coverage rates in the preretirement age group.
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for their retirement, they do not receive the benefits of the sub-
sidy. Perhaps more importantly, some uncovered workers do not
succeed in compensating for their lack of pension coverage. The
public component of retirement income, Social Security, is seldom
adequate to provide income maintenance.33 To be sure, the goal of
income maintenance has for the most part been met. The vast ma-
jority of older Americans are not destitute and have resources suf-
ficient to provide a standard of living as high as that enjoyed prior
to their retirement.3 4 However, a group too large to be ignored suf-
fers a dramatic drop in living standards after retirement.3 5 Perhaps
the most troubling aspect of current coverage gaps is that the indi-
viduals most likely to lack coverage are those low income workers
who are in turn most likely to fall below the poverty line in retire-
ment. Congress's particular concern with low income workers
shows most clearly in the non-discrimination rules. 6 The law gov-
erning non-elective plans does not require employers to cover all
workers. Rather, the conditions of the deduction require that the
employer plan satisfy non-discrimination rules which restrict the
extent to which higher-paid employees can receive higher bene-
fits.3 7 But in spite of these rules, individuals who are inadequately
'3 See, for example, Altman, 42 Tax L Rev at 501 (cited in note 3). The percentage of
wages eventually replaced by Social Security has vacillated wildly over the years, and even
within cohorts, benefit levels can vary enormously because of income, marital status, and
the workforce participation of the secondary earner. For example, in 1971, Social Security
replaced only 28.2% of the unadjusted earnings of a married couple whose career average
earnings were between $12,500 and $20,000, while in 1979 they replaced 99.8% of the career
average earnings of a couple whose lifetime earnings were below $7,500. Boskin and Shoven,
1987 Issues in Pension Econ at 125 (cited in note 3). For all households that retired in 1969,
replacement rates adjusted for various cost-of-living factors have varied from 33.1% in 1969
to 94% in 1979. Id at 133. See generally, id at 123-33. The higher figures for the 1979 period
are thought generally to represent an unsustainably high level, and indeed to have caused a
crisis in the financing of the system. Feldstein, 81 Pub Interest at 104-05 (cited in note 3).
3' Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak and Lawrence H. Summers, The Adequacy of
Savings, 72 Am Econ Rev 1056 (1982); Boskin and Shoven, 1987 Issues in Pension Econ at
113 (cited in note 3).
35 Boskin and Shoven, Poverty Among the Elderly (cited in note 3).
36 IRC §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b). Pension benefits proportional to wages, at least up to the
ceiling amounts, are permissible. IRC § 401(a)(5)(B).
31 IRC § 401(a)(4). At first glance, these rules might seem to be motivated by distribu-
tive rather than paternalistic impulses. This theory is most clearly expressed by one of its
critics. Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-Dis-
crimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U Chi L Rev 790, 805-14 (1988). But non-paternalistic
distributive impulses can explain only a small part of the present scheme. The Code does
not spell out the mechanism by which employer plans are supposed to effect redistribution,
but the drafters apparently assumed that the non-discrimination rules would force high in-
come employees to cross-subsidize low income employees.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that cross-subsidization occurs, it cannot ex-
plain many features of the current scheme. Cross-subsidization might justify the preference
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served by the present system of pension coverage are typically also
in lower income groups"
Under the present pension system, then, those most in need
are likely to suffer most from inadequate coverage. It is important
to ask, therefore, whether there is some better way to achieve our
paternalistic pension goals. But we can address this policy question
only with some theory of why paternalistic intervention is required
in the first place. Although the most obvious analytical tool is eco-
nomics, it has been surprisingly difficult to modify economic theory
to justify paternalistic aims. The next section examines why.
II. NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: POLICY WITHOUT PATERNALISM
A. Economic Savings Theory
Economists who attempt to evaluate American pension policy
face a serious methodological difficulty. They must work with a
conception of human behavior fundamentally at odds with the pa-
ternalistic world view.
It may help to begin by contrasting economics with common
sense. Why do some people not save enough for their old age?
From a common sense perspective, individuals who fail to save
enough fall into several different groups. Some people, whom I will
call myopes, simply do not think very much about the future. They
spend money as they receive it. When they retire they are forced to
lower their consumption level, and they regret not having saved
more. Other people, whom I will call impulsives, worry about pro-
viding for their old age, and continually resolve to save more, but
find that money burns a hole in their pocket. Such people spend
their paycheck the moment they receive it. On Monday they regret
the impetuousness of Friday, and promise themselves not to repeat
it, yet they find next Friday that temptation is again too great.
Still another group, whom I will call impatients, always believe
for employer plans over IRAs, but it cannot explain why CODAs are treated less generously
than non-elective employer plans. Since employers can match CODA contributions, direct
cross-subsidization seems as likely as in a non-elective plan, and indirect cross-subsidization
may occur if higher income employees can be made to absorb fixed costs of fund manage-
ment. Of course, Congress may simply believe that it is getting a free lunch by forcing em-
ployers to pay for pensions. I do not believe that there is any need to comment on the
plausibility of this view.
3' For evidence of lower pension coverage among lower income workers, see Freeman,
Unions, Pensions and Union Pension Funds at 89, 98-99 (cited in note 3). For evidence that
pensions and Social Security combined are most likely to be adequate for those with low
incomes, see, for example, Boskin and Shoven, Poverty Among the Elderly at 131 (cited in
note 3).
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that present consumption needs are especially pressing. Although
they see the need to save for future consumption, they believe that
it will be easier to save from next year's wages than from this
year's. But when next year comes, current consumption seems
more pressing than it did in previous years, and the amount that
they ultimately save for retirement is far less than what they antic-
ipated while young. The vagaries of cash flow influence the deci-
sions of impatients much less than they do those of impulsives.
Impatients have no cycle of Friday binges and Monday morning
regret, but rather plan consciously to spend more this year than
next. Finally, some people, whom I will call deliberates, plan when
young to consume less as they grow old, and follow this consump-
tion plan without any later regret.
The economic theory of savings behavior rejects these distinc-
tions. Economists instead regard all four savings patterns de-
scribed above as instances of a single type of rational behavior. All
four cases are assimilated to that of deliberates, or rational agents
who simply prefer present consumption to saving.39
Economic theory postulates a consumer who consumes various
goods, whose consumption opportunities are limited by his income,
and who is able to choose rationally among the consumption goods
he can afford to obtain the bundle of goods he most prefers. The
consumer chooses bundles of goods so as to maximize his total util-
ity. In general, such a consumer's decisions will conform to the
neoclassical principle of marginalism: The consumer will increase
his consumption of any given good until the relative marginal cost
of the good equals its relative marginal benefit.40 Finally, economic
theory assumes that the individual's preferences about various
consumption goods, sometimes referred to as his utility function,
are stable or unchanging between decisions. This general method-
ology is referred to as consumer theory.4'
Economists apply consumer theory to savings decisions by
treating present consumption and future consumption as two dis-
tinct goods. An individual's decision to save is a decision to defer
present consumption in favor of future consumption. Thus the in-
3' See, for example, Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 111 (W. W. Norton, 2d ed
1984); Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 297 (Cambridge, 4th ed 1985); Jack
Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 78-88 (Prentice-Hall, 4th ed 1988); Mark Kel-
man, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wisc L Rev 769; Jerome Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty,
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 326, 327 (MacMillan and Free Press,
1968). See notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
40 See, for example, Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect at 297 (cited in note 39).
41 See, for example, Varian, Microeconomic Analysis at 111 (cited in note 39).
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dividual's decision to allocate consumption between temporal peri-
ods is analytically identical to the decision to allocate income be-
tween two goods in one period. 2
Utility maximization is merely a descriptive theory that
predicts how people will behave in the future based on their past
behavior. In order to determine which consumption choices would
maximize an individual's welfare, economists must make some fur-
ther assumptions. Welfare economics provides them by postulating
that an individual's preferences, as expressed in the consumption
choices he makes, are the only measure of his well-being.4" Welfare
economics places no substantial restrictions on the content of
preferences.44
Neoclassical theory is compatible with a startling range of in-
dividual choices. An individual's behavior may be self-destructive,
repellent, or tasteless and still meet the neoclassical definition of
rationality.4" In particular, from the perspective of neoclassical the-
ory, there is no important difference between the various types of
low savers described above. 46 Rather, under neoclassical economic
theory, impulsives, impatients, and myopes are just varieties of de-
liberates, or rational utility maximizers who happen to prefer con-
sumption today to consumption tomorrow. The subjective feelings
of regret or of unmet expectations which serve in part to distin-
guish myopes, impulsives, or impatients from deliberates are of no
significance.47
The conclusion that all savings decisions are potentially ra-
tional strikes many as implausible. If utility were directly observa-
ble, the irrationality of some savings decisions could be shown di-
rectly. Specifically, an individual who sometimes failed to choose
his most preferred bundle would violate the hypothesis of rational
utility maximization. But economists argue-along with many crit-
42 These assumptions-and consumers who conform to them-are sometimes referred
to as neoclassical to distinguish them from other possible assumptions about behavior that
might be called economic. Id.
43 This is implicit in the use of individual preferences in welfare analysis: The optimum
of the consumer is determined solely by reference to his preferences. See, for example,
Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications at 78-88 (cited in note 39). See also Kelnan,
1979 Wisc L Rev at 769 (cited in note 39) (criticizing extreme commitment to consumer
sovereignty); Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty at 327 (cited in note 39).
4, Neoclassical theory does place some formal restrictions on the content of individual
preferences, and it assumes that preferences are complete, continuous, reflexive and transi-
tive. See, for example, Varian, Microeconomic Analysis at 111-12 (cited in note 39).
" Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications at 9 (cited in note 39).
'6See note 39 and accompanying text.
'7 Keiman, 1979 Wisc L Rev at 778-87 (cited in note 39) (discussing and attacking neo-
classical disregard of subjective phenomena).
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ics of classical utilitarianism-that only choices, and not their cor-
responding utility, can be observed. Since the preferences of a ra-
tional individual cannot be observed, economists assert, we cannot
directly test the hypothesis that individuals maximize utility.
Rather, the utility of a neoclassical individual must be inferred
from revealed preferences, that is, from the consumption choices
that that individual actually makes.48 Economists regard only one
form of evidence as undermining their basic hypothesis, and that is
evidence of inconsistency. 9 In general, a set of individual choices
results from preference maximization if and only if, when choosing
between bundle A and bundle B on different occasions, the con-
sumer consistently chooses the same one. If the consumer some-
times chooses bundle A and sometimes bundle B, his choices are
inconsistent.50
Choice-based welfare theory has some strong analytical impli-
cations: Welfare theory does not recognize that an individual can
make mistakes about his own preferences; nor can an individual
fail rationally to implement those preferences; nor can outsiders
even ascertain an individual's optimal consumption bundle except
by examining his choices. This vision of human behavior means
that paternalistic savings policy cannot improve individual welfare.
As the very phrase "consumer sovereignty" suggests, economists
applying consumer theory assume that consumers know their own
interests best. Restrictions on individual choice of the kind that
permeate our existing pension system5' are difficult for neoclassical
economists to accept.52 But neoclassical economists do not believe
that national savings rates will, in the absence of government pol-
icy, always attain ideal levels. The next section will explain the
neoclassical approach to savings policy, an approach which has
colored many recent reform proposals.
48 See, for example, Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics 114 (W. W. Norton,
1987); see generally, id at 114-30.
4, See, for example, id at 114-30.
"* Id at 121-24. It must be emphasized that A and B are bundles of items, not individ-
ual items. Suppose that blueberries cost 49t a pint while raspberries cost $3.29 a pint. An
individual who buys one pint of blueberries on Tuesday and one pint of raspberries on
Thursday does not necessarily exhibit inconsistency. Suppose, though, that over the course
of a year the individual buys 17 pints of raspberries and 42 pints of blueberries. This combi-
nation can be thought of as a bundle. Over the course of the next year, the individual buys a
bundle consisting of 12 pints of blueberries and 61 pints of raspberries. If the individual's
income and the relative prices of all goods have remained the same, the choice of these
rather different bundles would constitute an inconsistency. Id.
51 See notes 9-29 and accompanying text.
62 Peter J. Ferrara, Social Security: Averting the Crisis 81 (Cato Institute, 1982).
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B. Efficiency-Based Reform Proposals
How would neoclassical economists remake the pension sys-
tem? Inevitably, they see no role for paternalism in pension policy.
Rather, they stress a wholly different aspect of pensions and Social
Security: how these programs affect national savings and conse-
quently national economic growth. They regard the question of
pension policy as only part of a larger concern for the promotion of
economic efficiency.55
As we have seen, neoclassical economists must, as a general
proposition, insist on freedom of individual choice. As a result,
they express little interest in employer pension plans, believing
that if individual choice is rational, the employer has no role to
play as an intermediary. They also tend to be hostile to any system
of savings subsidies, since a system of savings subsidies financed by
taxes merely distorts individual choice and reduces overall wel-
fare. 54 Subsidies with ceilings are less distorting, but only to the
extent that they have no effect on national savings levels. 5
53 "[T]he goal of public policy toward pensions is to eliminate artificial obstacles to
voluntary private market solutions for generating retirement income." Ippolito, Pensions,
Economics and Public Policy at 207 (cited in note 4).
Many economists do support the tax deductibility of pension contributions, but not
for paternalistic reasons. Instead, they believe that consumption is preferable to income as a
tax base for efficiency or equity reasons. They defend the pension deduction because they
regard it as the removal of a bad tax rather than as a subsidy, which they would oppose.
See, for example, Ippolito, Pensions and Economics at 35-37 (cited in note 4).
55 If, as the economic model implies, individuals make decisions only on the margin, a
subsidy with a ceiling will cause any consumer whose preferred savings level exceeds the
c2--
c1*
C2 2 ....
(future
consumption)
c2..................
cl*°*  c1" cl**
cl
(present consumption)
ceiling amount to shift funds into the tax-favored vehicle without changing his total level of
savings. In the diagram above, the thin line indicates the individual's initial budget con-
straint, while the bent heavy line indicates a tax subsidy with a ceiling at c2****. If the
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In the neoclassical world, a mandatory savings plan has no
more paternalistic justification than a tax subsidy. If the level of
savings required by the plan is above the level the individual
would have chosen if left to his own devices, so that individuals are
initially at the optimum, mandatory savings schemes will reduce
welfare by raising savings above the optimal point. Conversely, if
the level of savings required by the plan is below the level that
would be chosen freely, the mandatory plan will have no effect; it
will do no harm but serve no purpose.16
Nevertheless, efficiency-oriented economists are not hostile to
all pension reform proposals. Although neoclassical economics
implies that savings levels are individually rational, it also suggests
that they may be below the socially optimal level. This is a result
of a simple externality, referred to as the overlapping generations
consumer's optimal savings is, as in the diagram, a savings level like cl***, c2*** that is
above the ceiling level, the tax subsidy operates just like a flat rate income transfer. Such a
transfer produces a parallel shift, in this case one which produces the straight line extending
from c2** to cl*.
Of course, these subsidies with ceilings do have a peculiar distributive effect, namely,
they provide a transfer in the amount of the subsidy. See William G. Gale and John K.
Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving 2 (Jul 16, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev). Compare
Maurice MacDonald, Food, Stamps, and Income Maintenance 52-58 (Academic, 1977)
(food stamps).
5' The reason that mandatory plans may have no effect is similar to the reason that
subsidies with ceilings may be like income transfers. See note 57. The consumer's original
budget constraint is the straight line connecting cl* and c2*. A mandatory plan requiring
savings at level c2*** will have no effect on a consumer who planned to consume c2"*,
greater than c2***.
c2
o
c2 .......
c2
(future
consumption)
c2.................
ci". ci'
cl
(present consumption)
s See, for example, Boskin, Too Many Promises at 139-71 (cited in note 3); Boaz, NY
Times at A27 (cited in note 4); Scoville, NY Times at A23 (cited in note 4). See notes 58-64
and accompanying text.
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problem: savings affects the welfare of future generations, but
those generations play no role in determining today's savings.
Thus, the national savings level may be too low to protect the in-
terest of future generations.
Economists who accept this argument offer a number of policy
prescriptions. They argue that policies such as capital taxes exacer-
bate the problem of low savings and are therefore undesirable.5
They endorse various pension tax subsidies as a subsidiary compo-
nent of their general advocacy of capital tax cuts, 59 such as the
Bush Administration's proposed capital gains cut. The Bush Ad-
ministration has also proposed a more restricted variant, a Family
Savings Account that would, with certain income restrictions, per-
mit tax free accumulation on up to $2500 in annual contribu-
tions °.6  These accounts would be less paternalistic than IRAs, be-
cause in seven years the funds could be withdrawn for any purpose
without incurring tax on the appreciation. 1 Other efficiency pro-
posals include attempts to broaden the scope of existing retirement
tax breaks. Both the Bush Administration and Senator Lloyd
Bentsen have introduced measures, for example, that would raise
IRA contribution ceilings and permit tax free transfers from them
to certain other investments.6 2
58 See, for example, Lawrence H. Summers, Issues in National Savings Policy, in F.
Gerard Adams and Susan M. Wachter, Savings and Capital Formation 65, 73-75 (D. C.
Heath, 1986). The overlapping generations argument is not wholly dispositive of the ques-
tion of capital taxes since the true cost of such taxes depends in part on the alternatives to
theory. Labor taxes have adverse efficiency consequences also, though possibly fewer than
capital taxes, especially since labor supply does not involve externalities like the overlapping
generations problem. Thus, while efficiency criteria do not clearly dictate whether we should
tax interest, economists who are concerned about efficiency tend to favor exempting interest
income.
59 See, for example, Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 207-18 (cited in
note 4).
60 HR Rep No 3972, § 202, 101st Cong 2d Sess (Feb 7, 1990) (Archer).
61 Id at § 202(e).
62 Id at § 201 (housing; administration proposal); S 612, § 101, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Aug
2, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec S12183 (daily ed, Aug 2, 1991) (housing and education; Bentsen
proposal). The Bush proposal was also limited to families with income of less than $120,000
per year. HR 3972, § 292(c)(3). Modified IRA proposals that would permit similar with-
drawals include HR 960, § 301, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 19, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec H1023
(daily ed, Feb 19, 1991) (Delay, R-Tex); HR 1074, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 21, 1991), in 137
Cong Rec H1136 (daily ed, Feb 21, 1991) (Neal, D-Mass); HR 1291, 102d Cong, 1st Sess
(Mar 6, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec H1454 (daily ed, March 6, 1991) (Wylie, R-Ohio); HR 1406,
102d Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 12, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec H1669 (daily ed, Mar 12, 1991) (Pickle,
D-Tex); HR 1731, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 11, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec H2177 (daily ed, Apr
11, 1991) (Hubbard, D-Ky); HR 2340, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (May 14, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec
H3036 (daily ed, May 14, 1991) (Tallon, D-SC); HR 2478, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (May 29,
1991), in 137 Cong Rec H3709 (daily ed, May 29, 1991) (Gilimor, R-Ohio); S381, § 301, 102d
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What about mandatory plans? Here again sophisticated neo-
classical economists are willing to support some degree of interven-
tion. The same overlapping generations concern that leads some
economists to accept the principle of subsidies also leads them to
accept the principle of forced savings. Other concerns are at work
as well. Neoclassical economists recognize that individuals may de-
liberately not save in order to take advantage of welfare-type So-
cial Security.13 With such concerns in mind, efficiency-oriented
commentators insist on the importance of a funded Social Security
program, or a mandatory universal pension system ("MUPS").6 4
Neoclassical economists also have their own way of looking at
restrictions on and protections of pension assets. They believe that
restrictions on pension withdrawals serve no good purpose and
that the welfare of a consumer can never be improved by reducing
the choices available to him. A deliberate consumer who withdraws
from his pension fund in the absence of restrictions does so for a
good reason. Similarly, the special protection from creditors ac-
corded to pensions cannot be justified. The argument for debtor
protection appears to be that creditors are more likely to be risk-
neutral firms and therefore better risk-bearers than personal debt-
ors, who are likely to be risk-averse."5 Thus, economic efficiency
might seem to dictate that the risk of personal bankruptcy be
shifted to those firms. Yet some neoclassical economists argue that
such differences in attitudes toward risk do not justify the present
scheme of compulsory protection, since creditors and debtors could
achieve an efficient allocation of risk by contract.66 Economic the-
ory, moreover, suggests strong reasons against providing special
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 6, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec S1723 (daily ed, Feb 6, 1991) (Wallop, R-Wy)
(same as HR 960).
"' Boskin, Too Many Promises at 10 (cited in note 3).
" Because Social Security taxes are used to pay current benefits and are not invested,
Social Security does not contribute to national savings. Commentators have made this point
in the context of the dispute about the extent to which Social Security reduces private sav-
ings. See note 63. However, even if Social Security did not reduce private savings at all, an
unfunded Social Security system would obviously produce a lower national savings rate than
a funded system. Because economists believe that individuals choose rationally, they favor
reforming the Social Security system so that it is not only funded, but privatized. S 2026
(cited in note 4); HR 3083 (cited in note 4); Boaz, NY Times at A27 (cited in note 4). The
Porter and Symms proposals would permit transfer of Social Security funds to IRAs or
other qualified plans and would thus allow some degree of private control of investment
management. They thus contrast with proposals which would create a public trust fund.
See, for example, Scoville, NY Times at A23 (cited in note 4).
8 See generally Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 211-25 (cited in note 48).
" Compare Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43
U Chi L Rev 499, 507-09 (1976).
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protection to pensions. One argument is that debtors are better sit-
uated than creditors to evaluate their own risk of bankruptcy or
default and to decide whether to incur additional debt. Sheltering
pension assets from creditors blunts the debtor's incentive to act
on this information, creating a moral hazard problem.17 In addi-
tion, when default or bankruptcy becomes inevitable, debtors may
transfer to pensions to shelter them from creditors. Special protec-
tions for pensions thus arguably provide debtors with a means of
defrauding creditors.
Neoclassical economics thus provides grounds for rejecting
some of the restrictions in the present system, but neoclassicists
are still willing to accept a fair range of restrictions on individual
choice. Notably, though, the restrictions economists accept are re-
strictions directed at externalities, not those driven by paternal-
ism. Paternalism thus remains outside the range of the concerns of
neoclassical economists.
III. THE NON-NEOCLASSICAL CRITICS: PRAGMATIC PATERNALISM
The present system of retirement income security has been
criticized not only by neoclassicists but also by those who, like
Congress, believe that individuals may fail to save as much as they
should for their retirement. These critics, who advocate paternalis-
tic intervention, operate from a more pragmatic, less theoretical
perspective than the neoclassical commentators.
Although these commentators see a need for paternalistic in-
tervention, they do not always express their paternalism directly.68
Rather, they emphasize the distributive shortcomings of the pre-
sent pension system. 9 Some of the complaints couched in distribu-
" See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L Rev
953 (1981).
63 A typical statement is made by Nancy J. Altman:
[I]t is extremely difficult to forecast how much one will need at retirement and, there-
fore, how much one must save during one's working life. Even if an individual could
make the necessary calculations... the savings would provide a frequently irresistible
temptation to meet more immediate needs such as those arising from illnesses, unem-
ployment, home purchases, and children's education.
Altman, 42 Tax L Rev at 502 (cited in note 3) (footnote omitted). More explicit discussions
include Bankman, 55 U Chi L Rev at 790-835 (cited in note 37): Bruce Wolk, Discrimina-
tion Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70
Va L Rev 419, 466 (1984); James Tobin, The Future of Social Security: One Economist's
Assessment, in Theodore R. Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, eds, Social Security: Beyond
the Rhetoric of Crisis 41 (Princeton, 1988).
69 Altman, 42 Tax L Rev at 470 (cited in note 3); Graetz, 135 U Pa L Rev at 865 (cited
in note 4).
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tional terms are truly about fairness. Certainly these complaints
are legitimate, but no methodological innovations are needed to
make them. The neoclassical approach can accommodate distribu-
tive as well as efficiency concerns.7 0 Neoclassicists who emphasize
distribution favor taxing interest income, which is disproportion-
ately received by the more affluent.71 Observers concerned with
distribution regard deductions to retirement income savings as de-
viations from an ideal tax base that must be justified on other
grounds.7 2 From this neoclassical distributive perspective, the cur-
rent pension system is seriously flawed. The use of deductions as
the primary tax subsidy tool favors the well-to-do. While the pre-
sent system of tax subsidies, with its ceilings and non-discrimina-
tion rules, to some extent modulates these inequities, it creates
others by relying on employers. Left to their own devices, employ-
ers will provide more generous pensions to high income workers.
Only about half of the work force is covered by an employer-spon-
sored pension plan, and only about two-thirds will ultimately re-
ceive pension benefits. 3
Yet if ostensibly distributive concerns had no paternalistic
component, there would be no need to resort to pension policy at
all. Rather, progressive tax cuts and transfers could redistribute
income to people during their working life, since individuals can in
principle save by themselves.7 4 In fact, though, some distributive
commentators implicitly reject the neoclassical view that all sav-
ings levels are rational. Rather, they believe that savings levels
should be roughly proportional to income. To put it differently,
they feel that the proportion of wage income that should be re-
placed by retirement income, or the replacement ratio, should be
roughly constant across income groups, and should enable people
to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living.7 5 Most Ameri-
70 An emphasis on distribution, though, will change certain policy prescriptions. See
Deborah Weiss, Welfare for the Rich: The Case for Progressive Tax Credits for Savings §
III (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev).
71 See, for example, Richard Goode, The Superiority of the Income Tax, in J.
Pechman, ed, What Should Be Taxed, Income or Expenditure? 49, 56, 72-73 (Brookings
Institution, 1980).
71 As the efficiency-oriented commentators suggest, these revenue losses are to some
extent offset by countervailing efficiency gains because the distortionary tax on capital in-
come is removed. These gains may in turn be reduced to the extent other taxes are levied to
make up the revenue shortfall.
13 Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Daniel E. Smith, Pensions in the American Economy 26,
69 (Chicago, 1983).
7' Weiss, Welfare for the Rich § III (cited in note 70).
75 Graetz, 135 U Pa L Rev at 855-56 (cited in note 4).
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cans meet even this stricter definition of rationality.6 Most retired
Americans are able to maintain a standard of living at least as high
as that enjoyed during their working years, and only a relatively
small group falls below the poverty line." A significant group of
retired Americans, though, does suffer a dramatic drop in living
standards after retirement.78 Not surprisingly, individuals who had
low incomes during their working lives are far more likely to fall
below the poverty line in retirement.79 Interestingly, individuals
whose relative standard of living drops are more often in higher
income groups.80 The larger drop among higher income workers ap-
pears to be primarily due to the effects of a progressive system of
Social Security benefits. 1 In the absence of public assistance, those
with less income during their working lives would suffer relatively
greater declines in replacement rates.8 2
Distributive-paternalistic observers thus wish to broaden the
coverage of retirement income security programs without increas-
ing the subsidy to the already covered and presumably affluent.
The suggested alternatives are themselves problematic, however.
An across-the-board reduction of capital taxes would be an ineffi-
cient means to this end, since most of the subsidy would be paid to
well-to-do consumers who are already high savers.83 Some distribu-
tive-paternalistic observers would consider allowing subsidies (up
76 Although the public component of retirement income-Social Security and subsi-
dized pensions-is seldom adequate to provide income maintenance, most comprehensive
studies suggest that the goal of income maintenance has been for the most part met. See
note 68.
7 Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers, 72 Am Econ Rev at 1060-66 (cited in note 34); Bos-
kin and Shoven, 1987 Issues in Pension Econ at 113 (cited in note 3).
78 Boskin and Shoven, Poverty Among the Elderly (cited in note 3).
79 Id at 128-31.
80 Id at 131-32.
81 Id at 132.
82 The lower propensity of those with lower incomes to save suggests that they would
suffer disproportionately from the elimination of Social Security. See Emily C. Lawrence,
Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data, 99 J Pol Econ 54, 66-
69 (1991); M. Kurz, R. G. Spiegelman, and R. W. West, The Experimental Horizon and the
Rate of Time Preference for the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments: A
Preliminary Study, Stanford Research Institute, Research Memorandum 21 (Nov 1973);
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise, The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect
of Limit Changes, in Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise, eds, Pensions in the
U.S. Economy 9, 11-14 (Chicago, 1988).
$3 A number of studies suggest that the well-to-do have lower rates of time preference,
and thus a greater tendency to save for the future. Lawrence, 99 J Pol Econ at 66-69 (cited
in note 82); Kurz, Spiegelnan, and West, The Experimental Horizon at 24 (cited in note
82). Similarly, many studies have found that higher income taxpayers are more likely to
contribute to IRAs. See, for example, Venti and Wise, The Determinants of IRA Contribu-
tions and the Effect of Limit Changes at 11 (cited in note 82).
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to a low ceiling amount) for voluntary plans like IRAs, CODAs, or
the Bush-Bentsen proposals.s4 Although these devices would not
have all the distributive problems of a capital gains cut, they
would suffer from another defect: those most in need of paternalis-
tic help are the least likely to be induced to save by incentives.
Consequently, distributive-paternalistic commentators are
likely to endorse schemes with a mandatory component.8 5 Some
merely advocate a strengthening of the current system of employer
pensions, in which incentives at the employer level are combined
with mandatory participation by covered individuals. Improved
coverage would be achieved by strengthening the non-discrimina-
tion rules.86 However, even if the existing system of employer pen-
sions were extended, the voluntary nature of firm pension coverage
would produce far from universal coverage. Individuals who work
for firms, generally small ones without pension plans, cannot be
covered and thus cannot receive the tax subsidy. 7 Most distribu-
tive-paternalistic observers thus endorse a completely mandatory
scheme, such as a mandatory employer pension, or a MUPS unre-
lated to employment.8 8 These proposals, too, have problems.
Mandatory employer-sponsored plans might remedy the current
gaps in coverage, but small firms are likely to be inefficient provid-
ers of what is a sophisticated financial service. A MUPS would be
effective, but seems politically unlikely.8 9
In short, a distributive-paternalistic observer would like an in-
centive-based scheme that is effective in encouraging those least
likely to save to do so without help. But although these critics have
assumed the need for paternalism, they have made no attempt to
provide a rigorous model for analyzing why paternalism is neces-
sary or how paternalistic goals should be achieved. The distribu-
tive critics, whatever the merits of their proposals, have done no
better than the neoclassicals in explaining why paternalism is nec-
essary in the first instance.
", Graetz, 135 U Pa L Rev at 890-900 (cited in note 4).
85 President's Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age: Toward a National Re-
tirement Income Policy 41-44 (1981); Bankman, 55 U Chi L Rev at 825-26 (cited in note
37); Wolk, 70 Va L Rev at 466-67 (cited in note 68).
s Altman, 42 Tax L Rev at 456-500 (cited in note 3).
87 Andrews, The Changing Profile of Pensions in America at 164-69 (cited in note 4).
The connection between firm size and worker coverage has been established in many stud-
ies. See, for example, Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 189-90 (cited in
note 4).
88 President's Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age at 41-44 (cited in note
85); Bankman, 55 U Chi L Rev at 825-26 (cited in note 37); Wolk, 70 Va L Rev at 466-67
(cited in note 68).
"' Graetz, 135 U Pa L Rev at 907-08 (cited in note 4).
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It is difficult to design such a paternalistic scheme in the ab-
sence of an explanation for why individual choice fails. We still
lack the model of human behavior we need. The following sections
attempt to fill this gap.
IV. MODIFIED NEOCLASSICAL PATERNALISM: MYOPIA
The neoclassical model regards all low savers as "deliber-
ates"-rational utility maximizers who prefer present consumption
to future consumption. As a consequence, the neoclassical model
supposes that interventionist savings policy cannot improve indi-
vidual welfare. But the view that individual savings decisions are
necessarily optimal strikes many commentators as dubious. 0 Even
those who in general accept the neoclassical argument for con-
sumer sovereignty have misgivings about applying neoclassical wel-
fare analysis to savings. In particular, many economists and philos-
ophers question whether it is rational to value future well-being
less than present well-being.91
Those who take this approach exclude from the class of delib-
erates individuals who are "myopes," or who overly discount the
future. Philosophers generally analyze myopia in terms of dis-
counting future consumption, while economists analyze this prob-
lem in terms of discounting future utility.92 Either approach is a
" See, for example, A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 24-30 (MacMillan, 4th ed
1960); Eugen V. Bohbn-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capital 253-59 (William Smart,
trans) (MacMillan, 1891); Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits,
100 Q J Econ 303, 307-08 (1985); R. F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics 40 (MacMil-
lan, 1948); F. P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Savings, 38 Econ J 543 (1928). Philos-
ophers endorsing this view include John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 293-98 (Belknap, 1971);
Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens 66-68 (Cambridge, rev ed 1984). See note 92 and accom-
panying text.
11 See note 92 and accompanying text.
,2 An individual's intertemporal utility function is a function of the amount consumed
in all future periods s (written c,), and of the future periods s in which consumption occurs.
It is generally assumed that the utility of future consumption has a particular form, such
that the utility that consumers receive at time t from consumption cs at time s is equal to
some function u(c) reduced by a discount factor 0(s). The function u(c,) is the same for all
periods s but the discount function J(s) depends on s, that is, on the time of consumption.
Thus, the consumer's utility for c, is 0(s) times u(c,), or 0(s)u(c). His total utility from
consumption in all periods can be written as the sum of his utility from consumption in each
future period.
'I
U = E (s)u(Cs)
8-0
The most commonly used discount function is of the so-called exponential form R'
where R' is any constant, usually less than 1. The term R in this expression is often written
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theory of myopia. In common sense terms, myopia is an irrational
preference for present consumption over future consumption. In
economic terms, myopia is a discount rate that is irrationally larger
than zero, or irrationally higher than the interest rate.93 Thus even
consistent preferences may be irrational.
The irrationality of some consistent preferences is, of course,
deeply at odds with neoclassical theory. Pure neoclassical theory
places few restrictions on preferences, and consequently on which
savings patterns are rational. Neoclassical theory regards even very
low savings levels as rational. But the discount rate, in combina-
tion with the interest rate, determines the level of individual sav-
ings over time, and if certain preferences are myopic, then the as-
sociated savings patterns are irrational. Again, this can be put in
simple economic language. With a positive interest rate, the view
that the rate at which an individual should discount the future
should be zero implies that consumption should rise over the indi-
vidual's lifetime. The claim that the discount rate should equal the
interest rate implies that a rational agent would spread consump-
tion more or less evenly over a lifetime.9 4
The theory of myopic behavior provides a justification for in-
tervention in individual savings decisions as well as guidance about
the optimal savings point and the appropriate corrective tools. My-
in the form l+pS so as to make explicit the rate of time preference, p. The rate of time
preference, p, is in some respects similar to the interest rate. In particular, the rate of time
preference will equal the interest rate in equilibrium as long as there are no taxes or other
complications.
The best known statement by an economist of the view that positive time preference is
irrational is Pigou's hypothesis of a faulty telescopic faculty. Pigou, The Economics of Wel-
fare at 24-30 (cited in note 90). See also Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capital at
253-59 (cited in note 90); Feldstein, 100 Q J Econ at 307-08 (cited in note 90); Harrod,
Towards a Dynamic Economics at 40 (cited in note 90). Philosophers endorsing this view
include John Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 293-98 (cited in note 90); Jon Elster, Ulysses
and the Sirens at 67 (cited in note 90).
" See note 94 and accompanying text.
9 Max u(c)+(1+p)' u(c2) s.t. Y= cl+(1+r)'l c2
The first order conditions of this problem imply
u - (1+r)
uc2  (l+p)
where u(c1) = utility of period 1 consumption;
u(c2) = utility of period 2 consumption;
r = interest rate; and
p = rate of time preference.
Thus, when r=p, the marginal utility of consumption in the two periods is equal, so under
the usual assumption, consumption must be constant. Notice that if p=O and r>O, the
individual's consumption must rise over time. The distinction between uniform consump-
tion over time and a zero rate of time preference is obviously fairly technical, and it is not
always easy to discern which of the two positions non-economists are advocating.
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opes in many respects resemble their deliberate cousins: they make
decisions on the margin, and their behavior can be manipulated
with neoclassical tools. For a myope, the optimal level of savings is
simply the level that an individual with the rational discount rate
would choose. Both tax subsidies and mandatory plans can be used
to achieve this. A tax subsidy in the amount of the difference be-
tween the myope's discount rate and the rational discount rate will
cause the myope to save at the rational level. The use of tax ceil-
ings will undercut the effectiveness of any subsidy, since myopes
are still marginalist creatures.
A properly designed mandatory plan would similarly move
myopes to the optimal savings level. The appropriate level of
mandatory savings requires some further refinement of the theory,
in an assumption as to whether the individual's myopia extends to
future income as well as to future utility. If the individual's myopia
extends to future income-that is, if the myope does not think
about the fact that he will receive Social Security benefits in the
future-he will not reduce his voluntary savings. Thus, a
mandatory plan need only require the individual to save the differ-
ence between what he would have saved and the optimal level.95
Myopic preferences also justify withdrawal restrictions on pension
wealth and the protection of pension benefits from creditors. With-
out such limitations, myopes might undo the effects of paternalis-
tic policy.
A satisfactory theory of myopia would thus justify and provide
guidance for interventionist pension policy. But although the the-
ory of myopia allows us to employ some economic methodology, it
remains so deeply inconsistent with neoclassical assumptions that
the myopia theorist must jettison some valuable neoclassical struc-
tures. Presumptions that high discount rates or steeply declining
consumption are irrational disregards individual preferences, and
cannot easily be squared with neoclassical methodology. That is a
loss. The neoclassical equation of consistency and rationality may
be trivial, but it provides clear rules for determining which deci-
sions are rational and which are not. But if, as the myopia hypoth-
esis requires, some consistent decisions are to be classified as irra-
tional, some substitute criteria for rationality is needed. Without a
15 If the receipt of future benefits will offset, to some degree, the individual's present
savings, the mandatory plan must force the individual to save more than this difference,
perhaps the entire optimal amount. Still, although not logically implied by myopic prefer-
ences, myopia toward future benefits does seem to be a plausible corollary of such
preferences.
1991] 1299
The University of Chicago Law Review
differentiating criteria, it is hard to explain why a consumer's dis-
count rate can be ignored while the other parameters of his utility
function must be respected.9 6 And even if discount rates differ
from other parameters, why select low discount rates as rational?
Why should consumption be smooth or gradually increasing? Why
not fluctuating, or decreasing, or rapidly increasing?
In, the hope of improving on the theory of myopia, the next
few sections move from philosophy to experimental psychology, ex-
amining empirical evidence that intertemporal choices do not re-
sult from the rational maximization of stable preferences. This evi-
dence, I will argue, provides a less arbitrary reason than the theory
of myopia for rejecting consumer sovereignty arguments, although
it cannot provide a complete foundation for a welfare standard.
V. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMPATIENCE AND IMPULSIVENESS
The theory of myopia has not convinced neoclassical econo-
mists to relinquish their model of human behavior, for it provides
no precise theoretical reason for distinguishing myopes from delib-
erates. In this section, I will suggest that impatients and impul-.
sives cannot be forced into the neoclassical model. A look at psy-
chology reveals that their behavior exhibits inconsistency, the one
fact that neoclassical economics cannot explain.
A. Time-Inconsistent Preferences
Suppose that on December 25, 1990, an individual is given a
choice between $100 on December 25, 1994, and $110 on January 1,
1995; he chooses the $110. However, if he were given the same
choice on. December 24, 1994, he would prefer the $100 the next
day rather than wait eight days for $110. When, as in this example,
the individual would make a different decision at a later period,
the decision is said to be time-inconsistent or dynamically incon-
sistent.9 7 Intertemporal inconsistencies are a special case of the
" These considerations have caused many to defend consumer sovereignty in the inter-
temporal context. Otto Eckstein, Investment Criteria for Economic Development and the
Theory of Intertemporal Welfare Economics, 71 Q J Econ 56, 74-79 (1957); P. T. Bauer,
Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries 112-15 (Duke, 1957).
'7 The phenomenon of time inconsistency was first analyzed in R. H. Strotz, Myopia
and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 Rev Econ Stud 165 (1957). How-
ever, as Derek Parfit points out, Hume had described it quite precisely:
[I]n reflecting upon any action which I am called upon to perform a twelvemonth
hence, I always resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be con-
tiguous or remote.... But on a nearer approach ... a new inclination to the good
springs up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere rigidly to my first purpose and
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more general phenomenon of inconsistent choice, which can also
occur within a single period.
A growing body of laboratory evidence suggests that many
human subjects make dynamically inconsistent choices. The most
commonly accepted explanation for this phenomenon is that indi-
vidual preferences are not stable."8
1. How time-dependent change causes dynamically inconsis-
tent choices.
Many different factors can cause preferences to change. One of
the most important is the passage of time. If, over time, the con-
sumer's preferences change, the individual's utility for consump-
tion at time t will vary with the time at which preferences are eval-
uated. This stream of changing preferences can be represented by
a series of utility functions for each period. 9
If the consumer's preferences have changed, then behavior
which the individual regards as optimal in one period will not ap-
pear to be optimal in the next. If an individual's preferences
change so that consumption now relative to consumption in other
periods seems more pressing than it did yesterday, then the indi-
vidual corresponds to the impatient consumer described earlier.100
In general, preference change will produce inconsistency.10 1 It
resolution.
David Hume, 2 A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk HI, Pt II, Sec VII, quoted in Derek Parfit,
Reasons and Persons 159 (Oxford, 1984).
'$ See sources cited in note 8. See also notes 103-05 and 117-20 and accompanying text.
n Alternatively and more succinctly, it can be represented by a single meta-utility
function that varies with time t. A changing intertemporal utility function specifies the util-
ity of the individual at some time t as a function of t,
Ut=U(co.
. 
c.. c, 0.. s. . n, t) s=0. . n
This function evaluated at any given t is the utility function for that period. If, as in the one
period or static case, the individual's preferences are perfectly stable, then preferences at
any time t can be represented by a utility function that does not vary with t, the time at
which preferences are evaluated. In contrast, for an individual who lives for n periods, stable
intertemporal preferences can be written
U=U(c0 . . es . Cn, 0..- n) sffi.. n
oc See note 97 and accompanying text.
101 This can be illustrated by some specific examples. Suppose as before that the utility
that consumers receive at time t from consumption c. at time s is equal to some function
u(c,). However, in contrast to the previous assumptions, suppose that the amount by which
consumers prefer present consumption to future consumption, the discount factor O(s,t), is a
function of t, the particular time the decision is made, as well as of s, the time when con-
sumption will occur. In general, the discount function 0(s,t) is assumed to be larger for more
remote periods, that is, for large values of s. Thus, at any given time t, the consumer's
utility for c, is 4(s,t) times u(c,), or 0(s,t) u(c). His total utility at any time t from consump-
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should be emphasized that the impatient is quite unlike the myope
or deliberate, for the time-consistency of preferences is unrelated
to the discount rate. An individual with stable preferences who dis-
counts the future at fifty percent per year-whether myopically or
deliberately-is nonetheless time-consistent. Conversely, an indi-
vidual who discounts the future at an almost imperceptible rate,
but whose preferences change, has time-inconsistent preferences. 10 2
tion in all periods can be written as the sum of his utility from consumption in each future
period:
n
Ut = X 6(s,t)u(c)
6-0
Suppose that the value that subjects place on delayed reward is inversely proportional to
delay s-t, or in other words, that the discount function takes the form O(s,t) = 1/[(s-t) +k]
and $u(cd)=('[S.t+L)u(c). In this formulation, k is simply a constant, like R in the previ-
ous exponential functions. This will be referred to as a proportional discount function. If the
discount function is proportional, the individual's utility at any given time t can be charac-
terized by
n
U = 2 ['/(s-t+k)] u(cs)
The time inconsistency of this can be seen from the following example. Suppose that k=1
and u(c2)=x -- so that
6u(c)= [(/(s-t+l)] x
As before, in period one, the individual is given a choice between receiving $100 in period 3
and receiving $36 in period 2. At this point he would choose the $100.
6u(100) = (100) (3-1+1) = 3 1/3
6u(36) =(36 - ) - (2-1+1) = 3
The same choice is repeated in period 2. In the second period, however, the individual
would rather receive 36 immediately than to walt for $100.
6u(100) = 100 .-- (2-1+1)= 5
6u(16) = 36.5 . (1-1+1 )= 6
The reason is that at higher values of t, a one-unit change in t produces a smaller change in
the discount factor. The proportional difference between 0 and V3 is less than between
and 1. The passage of time thus has a disproportionate impact on the utility of proximate
events.
Stable, unchanging preferences (i.e. where 0 =O(s)) will of course produce time-consis-
tent consumption plans, but one special type of changing preference is also time-consistent.
A set of utility functions at various times will produce time-consistent choices if the relative
value of consumption at any two points in time is the same regardless of the time at which
the comparison is made. This relationship holds for a discount function of the form R',
where R is any constant. This is sometimes referred to as an exponential discount function,
since the delay before c, is consumed, s-t, enters into the discount function as an exponent.
102 Strictly speaking, changing preferences will be inconsistent so long as they are not
exponential. For example, a minuscule hyperbolic rate, such as 1/(1.000001)t, is still time-
inconsistent.
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2. Empirical evidence.
There is by now an impressive array of evidence documenting
the existence of inconsistency.103 The source of this inconsistency
is less clearly established. Although it is generally assumed that
dynamically inconsistent choice results from preference change, it
is possible that inconsistency results from imperfect rationality.
Perhaps the most compelling type of evidence linking time in-
consistency to preference change is the phenomenon of precommit-
ment-individuals sometimes deliberately reduce the choices that
will be available to them in the future. This can be illustrated by
the following example. Suppose that reward B is larger than re-
ward A and would be preferred if the two were offered at the same
time. At time 0, the individual is offered choice Y between A at
time t and B at t + s. For large values of t, the individual prefers B
with a wait of t+s while for smaller values his preferences reverse
and he prefers A with a wait of t. Now suppose that at time -k (k
periods before time 0), the individual is given choice X. Choice X
allows the individual either: (1) access to choice Y after the pas-
sage of k periods, at time 0 or (2) reward B at time k+t+s. Sup-
pose that with waits of k+s and k+t~s the individual prefers B
to A, but with waits of t and t+s the individual prefers A. To
choose alternative (2) has no effect except to foreclose the possibil-
ity of choosing A at time 0. Yet experimental evidence shows that
subjects will in fact precommit in this way.10 4 It is difficult to inter-
pret this as anything but strategic behavior to impose self-con-
trol. 0 5 A perfectly rational subject has no motive to restrict his
choices in this way.
3. Implications for consumer sovereignty.
If preferences change, and with them the consumer's view of
how much he should consume in later periods, then individual sav-
103 Studies using humans include Navarick, 13 Learning and Motivation at 361 (cited in
note 8) (negative noise reinforcement with adults); Solnick, et al, 11 Learning and Motiva-
tion at 61 (cited in note 8) (same); Millar and Navarick, 15 Learning and Motivation at 61
(cited in note 8); Ainslie and Haendel, The Motives of the Will at 120 (cited in note 8);
Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 35 Mgmt Science at 270 (cited in note 8); Thaler, 8 Econ
Letters at 201 (cited in note 8). The research on animals is voluminous. Useful surveys can
be found in Ainslie, 82 Psych Bull at 463 (cited in note 8); Logue, 11 Behavioral and Brain
Sciences at 665 (cited in note 8).
1" See, for example, Rachlin and Green, 17 J Exprmtl Analysis Behavior at 15-17, 21-
22 (cited in note 8).
105 Yet it seems unlikely that individuals are wholly strategic. The evidence suggests
that pensions and Social Security do not produce the one-to-one offset to savings that would
be expected from a wholly rational strategic individual.
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ings decisions will not necessarily maximize welfare. Yet inferring
the breakdown of consumer sovereignty from changing preferences
is more problematic than it first appears. The first difficulty is that
determining the ideal level of savings raises some perplexing philo-
sophical questions. The ideal level of savings should presumably
depend in some way on preferences within periods, yet there is no
uncontroversial way of making the preferences of various periods
commensurable. One solution simply avoids the problem of com-
mensuration by using the most purely neoclassical measure of op-
timality, Pareto-optimality. Pareto-optimality occurs when no per-
son can be made better off without making any others worse off.106
At first glance, the Pareto criteria might seem to have little appli-
cation to the intertemporal choices of a single individual. However,
an individual's set of preferences over time is analogous to the
preferences of separate individuals in a single period. 107 Some
economists have modified the Pareto criteria to ask whether utility
in one period can be increased without decreasing utility in an-
other period by reallocating consumption between the periods. Us-
ing Pareto-optimality to evaluate intertemporal choice raises some
difficult technical problems, but suggests that the results of chang-
ing intertemporal preferences are sometimes Pareto-optimal, and
sometimes not.' Interestingly, nonoptimal levels of savings may
as easily be too high as too low.109
10 See, for example, Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 305-07 (cited in note 48).
107 If each period's utility were purely a function of that period's consumption, the
Pareto criteria would apply only trivially. Any diminution in a given period's consumption
would reduce utility in that period, so no Pareto-improving trades would be possible, and all
allocations would be Pareto-optimal. In fact, of course, future consumption does enter pres-
ent utility, and Pareto-optimality may break down, since the individual may derive the
same utility at time t from different allocations of consumption between other periods. For
example, the utility function in effect at time t might be indifferent between consumption at
time t and at time t1, while utility at time t1 might be improved only by increments to t1
consumption. A marginal addition to ct would therefore be inefficient. Whether individual
choice produces Pareto-optimal consumption depends on a variety of factors such as the
strategy employed toward future behavior, whether the past utility or consumption enters
current utility, and whether utility for future consumption is anticipatory or altruistic.
108 Few models directly consider the problem of a single person with changing prefer-
ences, but intergenerational growth models apply by analogy. Models in which such equilib-
ria are not Pareto-optimal can be found in Debraj Ray, Nonpaternalistic Intergenerational
Altruism, 41 J Econ Theory 112 (1987), while models with Pareto-optimal equilibria include
John Lane and Tapan Mitra, On Nash Equilibrium Programs of Capital Accumulation
Under Altruistic Preferences, 22 Intl Econ Rev 309 (1981) (Pareto-optimal if each genera-
tion takes into consideration preceding generation's preferences).
19 With changing preferences, this can occur because each period is generally assumed
to disregard the consumption and preferences of past periods. See, for example, Lane and
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The Pareto criteria is a limited tool, however, because it can-
not be used to evaluate the fairness of the distribution between
periods. To address the equity of various intertemporal allocations,
economists have drawn another analogy to a technique used to an-
alyze welfare issues among different individuals. Specifically, some
economists have examined distributional equity through the use of
an intrapersonal welfare function, similar to a social welfare func-
tion. While the social welfare function balances the utility of sepa-
rate people, 110 an intrapersonal welfare function balances the util-
ity functions of a single person over time.11 Economists construct
the social welfare function to embody various different distribu-
tional principles, of which the Rawlsian and the utilitarian are the
most prominent.112 This welfare function is not Paretian since it
requires comparisons of the utility levels achieved in each period's
or person's preference ordering. However, it is methodologically in-
dividualist since it respects the preferences of each period or per-
son by preserving the relative valuation of consumption bundles
contained in that period's or person's preference orderings. Use of
an intrapersonal welfare function does not amount to an endorse-
ment of the kind of paternalism that overrides preferences by, for
example, forcing individuals to watch "Masterpiece Theater"
rather than "Wheel of Fortune." The evidence of preference
change supports the inference that the choices of some individuals
are suboptimal. Like the Paretian analysis, the welfare function
Mitra, 22 Intl Econ Rev at 317 (cited in note 108); B. Douglas Bernheim, Intergenerational
Altruism, Dynastic Equilibria and Social Welfare, 56 Rev Econ Stud 119, 120 (1989). This
assumption of forward orientation has been criticized on philosophical grounds, Parfit, Rea-
sons and Persons at 158-63 (cited in note 97), but for many preference structures, such as
exponential ones, the assumption seems embedded in the logic of the function.
110 See, for example, Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 529-36 (cited in note 48).
m Strictly speaking, an intrapersonal welfare function is analogous to the class of social
welfare functions that involve a sequence of individuals over time. See, for example, Bezalel
Peleg and Menahem E. Yaari, On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when
Tastes are Changing, 40 Rev Econ Stud 391 (1972).
11' The Rawlsian function represents maximization of the welfare of the least well-off
period, Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 152-53 (cited in note 90), and the simple utilitarian
provides for maximizing the sum of each period's utility. The weights assigned to each util-
ity function vary according to the distributional principle embodied in the function. The
intertemporal intrapersonal welfare function can be written as
1 n w
W t
where W is some weight.
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suggests that with changing preferences individual choice often
fails to produce optimal results."'
None of the theoretically plausible welfare analyses support
the view that only zero (or at least low) discount rates are rational
and that such discount rates may be imputed to all agents. I at
least would be willing to respect the preferences of the deliberate
individual described earlier,1 4 who has stable, time-consistent
preferences but a high discount rate. As the time of lower, later
consumption draws near, such an individual will have no regrets
about his choices, while the time-inconsistent individual will." 5 It
is .therefore difficult to see any advantage gained by altering the
choices of a deliberate.
B. Situational Preference Change
So far I have discussed time-dependent preference changes.
However, preferences may change as a function of factors other
than time."' Such factors may produce inconsistencies in inter-
temporal choice that appear to be time-dependent but are not. Be-
tween time t and time t-+1 an individual's preferences between cs
and cs-+ 1 may reverse not because of the passage of time but be-
cause of changes in situational factors. Both types of inconsistency
are dynamic, but I will call inconsistencies caused by the passage
of time alone "time-dependent," and those resulting from other
factors "situational." Situational preference change produces be-
havior that corresponds to what most of us would call
impulsiveness.
"' Suboptimality with preference change results in part from the assumption that each
period disregards the consumption and preferences of preceding periods. See, for example,
Lane and Mitra, 22 Intl Econ Rev at 309 (cited in note 108); Bernheim, 56 Rev Econ Stud
at 119 (cited in note 109).
Note that dynamic inconsistency is not a sufficient condition for the existence of subop-
timal behavior. The best Rawlsian and utilitarian plans may not be Pareto-optimal, and
may themselves be time-inconsistent, at least under plausible constraints on individual be-
havior. Partha Dasgupta, On Some Alternative Criteria for Justice Between Generations, 3
J Public Econ 405 (1974); Bernheim, 56 Rev Econ Stud at 123-28 (cited in note 109) (so-
cially optimal plans not time-consistent).
114 See note 102 and accompanying text.
115 For discussions of the role of regret in justifying paternalism, see Kelman, 1979 Wis
L Rev at 778-87 (cited in note 39); Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Con-
tracts, 92 Yale L J 763 (1983). Regret seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient require-
ment for paternalistic intervention. If preferences change, then optimal current consump-
tion from the perspective of any given period will generally be higher than what would be
dictated by the point.
116 The utility function may be written to be dependent on these parameters x. In other
words, it may be written as
Ut=U(c0 . . c .... cn , 0 . . . s . . n , x ) s = 0 . . . n
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The best evidence of situational preference change is found in
the experiments of the social psychologist Mischel and others,
which have shown that self-control is facilitated by circumstances
that make it easy for the individual to keep his mind off tempta-
tion.1 7 In many of these experiments, subjects are given a choice
between a less preferred treat (say, gumdrops) now and a more
preferred treat (say, chocolate) later. It should surprise no one to
learn that a subject's attempt to delay is hindered if the gumdrops,
which he is permitted to eat now, are placed in front of him. Inter-
estingly, though, he is more likely to eat the gumdrops now if the
chocolate, which he is not permitted to consume, is placed in front
of him instead."18 In other words, thinking about the rewards of
delaying gratification reduces rather than increases self-control. If
preferences were purely a function of temporal distance, this
should not occur. Purely time-dependent models of preference
change imply that, given a choice between gumdrops at time t and
chocolate at t+1, people will choose chocolate at large values of t
and gumdrops at smaller values. The physical presence of the un-
available chocolate should have no effect on the decision to con-
sume the gumdrop now. If factors other than time, such as remind-
ers of a future reward, produce inconsistency, then that
inconsistency must result from a situational preference change.""
This situation-dependent change explains the behavior of the im-
pulsive, 20 who spends his paycheck when faced with temptation,
and quickly regrets his improvidence.
By identifying situational forces that cause inconsistent
choice, psychologists have distinguished the inconsistency of the
impulsive empirically from that of the impatient. Yet impatients
and impulsives share traits that distinguish them both from delib-
erates. There is the obvious fact of inconsistency. Moreover, as
with time-dependent preference change, the existence of precom-
mitments indicates the presence of situational preference change.
For example, for many years bank Christmas Clubs required con-
117 Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss, 21 J Personality and Soc Psych at 204 (cited in note 8).
118 Id.
" Loewenstein has explored a fascinating variation on this phenomenon in a study
that found that the willingness of subjects to defer consumption varied tremendously, de-
pending on how the deferral decision was framed. Especially important was whether the
decision was framed as a delay of something presently owned or as the expedited receipt of
a future interest. Loewenstein, 34 Mgmt Sci at 200 (cited in note 8). See also Loewenstein,
97 Econ J at 666 (cited in note 8). Situational preference change probably underlies the
problem of self-control as discussed by Thomas Schelling in his famous essay, The Intimate
Contest for Self-Command, in Schelling, Choice and Consequences at 57 (cited in note 8).
11o See text accompanying notes 117-19 for a description of the impulsive.
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sumers to deposit money weekly in a bank account that paid no
interest, and from which funds could not be withdrawn until late
November. The drug Antabuse, which makes the user nauseated if
he subsequently consumes alcohol, is voluntarily taken by al-
coholics to deter their own future consumption of alcohol. Both
Christmas Clubs and Antabuse are precommitment devices. If
preferences were independent of situational forces, individuals
would simply abstain from pre-Christmas spending or from alco-
hol. But there is a subtle difference between Antabuse and Christ-
mas Clubs, the precommitments of impulsives, and the precommit-
ments of impatients. The self-imposed limits of the impulsive
protect him from particular temptations at indeterminate future
times, while those of the impatient guard against increased temp-
tation that results solely from an increase in temporal proximity.
In some important ways, though, an impatient has more in
common with a deliberate than either does with an impulsive.
Most importantly, the behavior of impatients conforms to the fun-
damental neoclassical principle of marginalism,121 while the behav-
ior of impulsives does not. This feature of situational preference
change may explain some puzzling facts about savings behavior.
Suppose that two individuals, A and B, each have the same tastes
and each has a net worth of $100. The principle of marginalism
states that both should choose consumption levels that equate
marginal utility in the present period with marginal utility in fu-
ture periods.
Since both have the same level of wealth and the same tastes,
both should generally choose the same consumption levels. A qual-
ification to the principle of marginalism occurs if some wealth is
held in illiquid form. For example, suppose that both individuals
wish to consume $70 today. However, suppose that A's wealth is all
in liquid assets such as cash, while B's is allocated half to cash and
half to illiquid assets. A will be able to consume $70 today, since
his wealth is liquid. B, however, will not. The principle of
marginalism acknowledges that marginal utility between periods
may not be equated if some impediment (like illiquidity) inter-
feres. But that illiquidity can only interfere if it is on the margin,
that is, if it directly prevents consumption of the optimal marginal
level. Suppose that both A and B wish to consume $40 today.
Under the previous assumption that A's wealth is all liquid, while
B's is half liquid, both have liquid assets adequate to finance their
"I For an explanation of marginalism, see note 40 and accompanying text.
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desired level of consumption, so both should consume $40. Non-
marginal illiquidity-that is, illiquidity that does not directly ob-
struct the marginal decision-should not affect consumption
choices.1 2
Yet in practice it seems to do so: the marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) seems strongly positively correlated to non-mar-
ginal liquidity as well as to wealth.12 3 Under the previous assump-
tion that A has more liquidity than B, A will usually spend more
than B in the current period. To some extent this correlation may
result from taste differences. Consumers with low MPCs may be
more willing than consumers with high MPCs to lock assets away
in illiquid form. Likewise, taste differences may contribute to the
marginal propensity to consume housing wealth,124 since housing is
endogenous, or chosen by the individual. But non-marginal illiquid
assets, such as Social Security and to a lesser extent private pen-
sions, whose levels are exogenously set, also exert the same myste-
rious effect on spending. 25 These observations are hard to recon-
cile with deliberate or even impatient behavior, but make perfect
sense if people are impulsive. The availability of non-marginal
wealth is a situational factor, like the proximity of chocolate, that
affects behavior. Impulsive behavior may explain some of the poor
performance of the neoclassical savings model in econometric stud-
122 Hersh M. Shefrin and Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26
Econ Inquiry 609, 615 (1988).
123 For excellent surveys of these issues, see id at 609; Richard H. Thaler, Saving, Fun-
gibility, and Mental Accounts, 4 J Econ Persp 193 (1990).
"I See Jonathan Skinner, Housing Wealth and Aggregate Saving, 19 Regional Sci and
Urban Econ 305 (1989); Joyce M. Manchester and James M. Porterba, Second Mortgages
and Household Saving, 19 Regional Sci and Urban Econ 325 (1989).
121 Standard theory predicts that in a regression of total savings on various variables,
the coefficient on Social Security and pensions should be -1. Most studies found coefficients
that were negative and significant but did not approach -1. Lawrence J. Kotlikoff, Testing
the Life Cycle Theory of Social Security and Life Cycle Accumulation, 69 Am Econ Rev
396, 404 (1979) (-.666 for Social Security in savings equation with cross-section data); Phil-
lip Cagan, The Effects of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving: Evidence from a Sample
Survey, National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 95 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1965); George Katona, Private Pensions and Individual Savings (Mich-
igan, 1965); Alan S. Blinder, Roger H. Gordon, and Donald E. Wise, Social Security, Be-
quests and the Life Cycle Theory of Savings: Cross-Sectional Tests, in Franco Modigliani
and Richard Hemming, eds, The Determinants of National Saving and Wealth 89, 114
(cross-sectional data; coefficient on pensions has wrong sign, on Social Security -.39, and
neither significant); Robert J. Barro, The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving 21-
36 (American Enterprise Institute, 1978). But see Martin Feldstein and Anthony Pellechio,
Social Security and Household Wealth Accumulation: New Microeconometric Evidence, 61
Rev Econ & Stat 361 (1979) (coefficients in cross-sectional savings equation between -.57
and -1.67).
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ies.128 As we will see in the next section, the breakdown of
marginalism is of great interest to pension policy-makers.
More generally, impulsiveness presents more puzzles for neo-
classical welfare theory than impatience does. While time-depen-
dent preference change can be described easily using only the
neoclassical building blocks," 7 particularly individual choices, situ-
ational factors are not in the neoclassical's usual bag of economic
tricks. Consequently, describing the changes these factors produce
is not straightforward. 2 " The welfare analysis of impulsiveness is
similarly more problematic than that of impatience. The Paretian
and welfare function approaches to analyzing time-dependent pref-
erence change depend on preferences that are determinate enough
to allow comparisons among different situations. Situational pref-
erence change implies that preferences are so sensitive to circum-
stances that it is difficult to compare an individual's valuations
when circumstances change. If preferences are as indeterminate as
this, economists cannot easily base welfare analysis on individual
choices, and no one has yet suggested any comparably precise, the-
oretically appealing alternative. Any argument that a given savings
level is or is not optimal must ultimately appeal to intuitions, such
126 See Blinder, Gordon, and Wise, Social Security, Bequests and the Life Cycle The-
ory of Savings: Cross-Sectional Tests at 113-15 (cited in note 125).
127 Indeed, many such models exist. See Ray, 41 J Econ Theory at 112 (cited in note
108); Lane and Mitra, 22 Intl Econ Rev at 309 (cited in note 108); Bernheim, 56 Rev Econ
Stud at 119 (cited in note 109); Peleg and Yaari, 40 Rev Econ Stud at 391 (cited in note
111); Dasgupta, 3 J Public Econ at 405 (cited in note 113).
128 Situational factors such as proximity of the desired object might be inserted into the
utility function as a parameter x, so that utility would be written:
Ut=U(co c..- .. c. , 0 ... s . . n, x) s=0... n
However, incorporating these situational factors is obviously incompatible with the funda-
mental simplification of neoclassical theory, the restriction to two primitives, choices and
preferences, and one observable, choices. Enlarging the scope of economic theory in this way
produces two problems. The rationale for restricting admissible evidence to choices was to
rule out data that was unreliable, or difficult to quantify. Unless the situational variables x
can be uncontroversially observed and measured they are simply a deus ex machina. A
quantified social science requires some stylization of the determinants of behavior, and
there is at present no way of summarizing and aggregating the various factors that Mischel
identifies as relevant. For example, one of the situational variables might be referred to as
proximateness. Which is more proximate, a chocolate the subject can see or one he can
smell? The answers to such questions cannot be the data of investigation but are rather
subjects of investigation in themselves. Moreover, even if a general quantified theory of the
factors underlying, say, proximateness were available, and could be incorporated into a util-
ity function, the resulting framework might be a valuable tool for experimental psychology,
but it would not be terribly useful in the study of market behavior, since it is impossible to
know all the circumstances surrounding each market choice. Indeed, the need to stylize data
was one of the original motivations for restricting the class of primitives to choices.
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as that about the low likelihood that steeply declining lifetime con-
sumption maximizes utility.
VI. PATERNALISTIC PENSION POLICIES FOR IMPULSIVES AND
IMPATIENTS
As we have seen, there are troubling distributional flaws in our
present pension policy: the present system of retirement income
security provides the largest subsidies to affluent households that
would save without help, and leaves uncovered a significant part of
the population, many of whom suffer declines in income during re-
tirement." This coverage pattern results from relying on a private
pension system that is not mandatory in the sense that the provi-
sion of pensions by employers is voluntary. Consequently, coverage
is far from universal: individuals who work for firms without pen-
sion plans, generally small ones, cannot be covered, and thus can-
not receive the tax subsidy.130
All of the alternatives proposed to date have serious problems.
Mandatory employer-sponsored plans might remedy the current
gaps in coverage, but small firms seem likely to be inefficient pro-
viders of what is a fairly sophisticated financial service. Other
mandatory schemes are politically infeasible.' 3 ' Congress has good
reason to be reluctant to shift to a system of incentives from the
present reliance on Social Security and employer-sponsored pen-
sions. Non-employer schemes currently under consideration rely
too heavily on individual choice. These incentive-based plans, like
the Bush and Bentsen proposals, which essentially amount to
IRAs, are simply not well-designed to improve the situation of the
most impulsive or impatient consumers.3 2
Congress thus needs new proposals. This section will examine
some possible ways, founded on the empirical evidence I have ex-
plored, to incorporate paternalistic concerns without relying on So-
cial Security or employer oversight. It should be emphasized that
the empirical analysis of preference change is still quite tentative,
and it is premature to attempt to predict too precisely the effect of
"I See notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
130 Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 189-90 (cited in note 4).
"I Graetz, 135 U Pa L Rev at 907 (cited in note 4).
132 See notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
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any particular policy. However, the existence of preference change
suggests some general policy directions.
A. Incentive Plans
1. Situational preference change.
Incentive-based schemes to increase savings run the gamut
from a pure, unrestricted capital subsidy such as a capital gains
cut, to more narrowly tailored subsidies like IRAs, to heavily regu-
lated employer pensions. Congress has been skeptical about pro-
posals to shift from the present system favoring the more regulated
pension assets to a system with increased individual choice and
-pure tax subsidies.' 38 The evidence of situational preference
change suggests that this skepticism may be justified, and that
pure tax subsidies would be ineffective. The abstract future bene-
fits of a higher return on savings may seem slight at a time when
immediate temptation is great. A typical impulsive is an individual
to whom a good meal seems more appealing on Friday, when his
pay is received, but to whom future security seems more important
on Monday. It seems unlikely that an increase in the rate of return
from, say, ten to fifteen percent would influence such an individ-
ual's Friday behavior, and by Monday it is too late.
Capital subsidies, the standard neoclassical means of increas-
ing savings, are thus ineffective in dealing with an impulsive. But
the behavior of an impulsive individual can be manipulated with
two policy tools that will not affect a person with stable prefer-
ences: precommitments and "distraction techniques." Both
precommitments and distraction techniques in principle should
work without a subsidy, but a mixed policy that combined either
with a subsidy might be especially effective.
The simplest of the two is a distraction device. The key lesson
of Mischel's work is that factors that focus attention on the possi-
bility of gratification, whether present or delayed, tend to reduce
self-control. 34 For example, thinking about eating reduces the
ability to forego a less desirable food now in return for a more de-
sirable one later.13 5 An example of a distraction technique to en-
courage saving is a payroll withholding'plan that would allow em-
ployees to elect to have their employers deduct a certain amount
from their paycheck every week and deposit it in a savings ac-
count. Such plans might even leave the individual perfectly free to
I Many such proposals have been introduced, see notes 58-62 and accompanying text,
but none enacted.
"" See notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
235 Id.
1312 [58:1275
Pension Policy
terminate his participation or withdraw from the account at any
time. Yet the automatic nature of the withholding would tend to
discourage current consumption. An individual who must actually
force himself each week to divide his paycheck between his check-
ing account and his savings account resembles a child who must
look at the candy bar he wants. An automatic withholding plan
works in the same way as hiding the candy.
In principle, savings should rise when distraction mechanisms
are readily available, even in the absence of any subsidy or other
incentive to save. A mere payroll withholding option would proba-
bly induce at least some individuals to save more. In practice,
many employers and banks offer such schemes through direct de-
posit arrangements. But such withholding arrangements are not
available to all consumers-and even when they are available, im-
plementing them at present involves initiative and planning. In-
stead, Congress could institutionalize a withholding arrangement
by incorporating it into the tax withholding system. Individuals
could choose direct savings withholding by simply filling in one
more number on a W-4 form. The employer could direct funds
where the individual specified or into a Treasury Direct account.
This would to some extent mimic the common practice of deliber-
ately overwithholding in order to receive a refund, a habit to which
I reluctantly confess.
Withholding policies might be even more effective if combined
with a subsidy. But none of the present pension subsidies makes
systematic use of people's willingness to engage in distraction tech-
niques. IRAs permit homemade self-control devices: individuals
are permitted to make deposits to IRA accounts over the course of
the year, 3 6 and many employers and banks permit direct payroll
deposits, which employees can allocate between accounts. 3 7 But
the IRA direct-deposit arrangement takes initiative and organiza-
tion, and is not a precondition of the IRA tax subsidy. In practice,
many CODAs employ withholding arrangements, although the
Code does not require or encourage employers to offer withholding.
Indeed, the prevalence of withholding arrangements may contrib-
ute to Congress's preference for CODAs over IRAs. 3 8 But CODAs
have one substantial disadvantage: employers are not required to
provide them, and some people are self-employed, so not all work-
134 Nothing in the Code speaks to this point but a phone call to any bank will confirm
that such arrangements are easily made.
137 See note 20 and accompanying text.
See notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
1991] 1313
The University of Chicago Law Review
ers can take advantage of them. Congress could better obtain the
advantages of withholding by equalizing the subsidy to various
pension assets and facilitating withholding arrangements for IRAs
through payroll or tax withholding mechanisms. Indeed, even the
distributive problem with IRAs-that they serve primarily the af-
fluent-might diminish if withholding mechanisms made IRA par-
ticipation easier. An impressive body of evidence suggests that the
impulsiveness that withholding methods cure is more prevalent
among the less affluent. 13 9
Besides distraction techniques, a second potential set of reme-
dies for impulsiveness includes measures designed to encourage
precommitment against withdrawal. Specifically, legislators might
encourage individuals not only to withhold from their pay, but to
lock up their wealth in assets from which withdrawal was prohib-
ited, penalized, or merely difficult. Precommitment mechanisms,
like distraction techniques, should work in principle without a sub-
sidy, but precommitment, even more than distraction, makes bet-
ter sense as part of a subsidy plan. A belief in the value of precom-
mitments may in part explain Congress's preference for
noncontributory employer plans over CODAs, and for either over
IRAs.140 But there is in principle no connection between the illi-
quidity of a retirement asset and whether it is employer sponsored.
At present, IRAs are subject only to a withdrawal penalty,' 4 ' but a
number of other obstacles could be placed in the way of IRA with-
drawals. Congress could virtually prohibit withdrawals, as it does
for noncontributory employer plans. 42 As with CODAs, withdraw-
als might be subject to a hardship requirement, 43 whereby individ-
uals would have to make a formal application to the financial insti-
tution's plan administrator. Even if generally granted, this added
obstacle should discourage impulsive withdrawals of funds. Finally,
Congress might require advance notification of an intention to
withdraw.
The effectiveness of devices to discourage liquidity illustrates
the generally diminished relevance of marginalism to individuals
with situational preference change. A corollary is that the usual
economic arguments against tax ceilings do not apply to impulsive
1"' Further, the ideal subsidy would probably be progressive, that is, would be higher
for those in lower income groups. Weiss, Welfare for the Rich § III. A. (cited in note 70).
140 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
141 IRC § 72(t).
142 See note 26 and accompanying text.
143 IRC § 401(k)(2)(B)(i).
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individuals. Impulsives may replace amounts shifted into IRAs by
other liquid assets to a greater extent than deliberates.
A combined scheme of subsidies, precommitments, and dis-
traction devices could take many forms, but it is difficult to discern
the ideal structure of tax incentives from the existing experimental
evidence. The conventional implementation of a subsidy condi-
tioned on a precommitment would require an irrevocable decision
to withhold at the beginning of the tax year, followed by a tax de-
duction on that year's return. Alternatively, an individual who
agreed to the automatic withholding of $50 a week from his
paychecks for the next year might receive an immediate tax credit
of equal present value, instead of a later deduction. One potential
drawback of the conventional approach is that the reward is too
far delayed to affect behavior. On the other hand, Mischel's results
suggest that focusing on the reward for waiting may be as detri-
mental to self-control as focusing on immediate gratification. The
matter is complicated further by the fact that cool, non-arousing
reminders of reward increase self-control, while arousing reminders
decrease it."" Without further evidence it is difficult to speculate
on the timing arrangement that would maximize self-control.
2. Time-dependent preference change.
An impatient individual with time-dependent preference
change is more like a neoclassical consumer than an impulsive in-
dividual, and legislators must use different tools to alter the sav-
ings of impatients than to alter the savings of impulsives. Since the
impatient's preferences are stable, and are thus immune to situa-
tional factors, impatients respond in predictable ways to incentive
changes. Tax subsidies that are ineffective with impulsives can be
used to increase the impatient's savings. Second, impatients, like
rationals, ignore non-marginal illiquidity.145 The impatient allo-
cates resources so that the marginal costs and marginal benefits
are equated within the period. Policies that exploit the effect of
non-marginal liquidity on impulsive behavior will not work on im-
patients. A subsidy with a ceiling below the marginal level will not
increase savings, and distraction techniques will not deceive the
impatient into ignoring non-marginal wealth.
But legislators can manipulate the behavior of both impatients
and impulsives with precommitment mechanisms, which will not
affect the behavior of rationals. To be effective, though, precom-
144 See note 117 and accompanying text.
See note 125 and accompanying text.
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mitment mechanisms probably require a longer time horizon for
impatients than for impulsives. The impulsive wants to protect
himself from a relatively short, recurring cycle of binging and re-
gret, like spending every Friday's paycheck and regretting that
splurge every Monday. In contrast, the time-dependent preference
change of the impatient occurs over the course of his lifetime, and
evolves at a gradual rate. The effectiveness of precommitment de-
vices increases as the time at which the commitment must be met
is pushed further into the future. An impatient finds deferring con-
sumption from tomorrow to the next day easier than deferring con-
sumption from today to tomorrow, but finds it easier still to defer
consumption from a day in five years to five years and a day. This
lengthy time horizon indicates that a policy of directly encouraging
long-term savings commitments may not be feasible. It is difficult
to envision individuals entering into a long-term agreement to per-
mit tax withholding over a course of many years, especially given
each individual's uncertainty as to his future consumption needs.
Perhaps, though, the desirability of long-term precommit-
ments provides a partial justification for the home mortgage de-
duction,'146 the most maligned personal tax preference. 4 7 A mort-
gage is a kind of precommitment device in which the mortgagee
promises to make a series of payments over a long term. In addi-
tion, investment in housing seems to exploit situational factors as
well, since the present enjoyment of a home may make housing a
relatively painless form of savings for most impulsives.14 8 Of
course, the current housing deduction is not ideally designed: an
equity deduction would encourage savings more effectively than
the present interest deduction. 49
3. Protection from creditors.
If individuals behave as rational economic agents, the special
protection from creditors accorded to retirement assets' 50 is diffi-
... IRC §§ 163(a), 163(h)(1)-163(h)(3).
147 See, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex
L Rev 425, 452-56 (1982).
148 Some might argue that housing is not a form of savings for these purposes, since it
does not provide a flow of cash. But the imputed rental services of a fully paid house
reduces the homeowner's cash needs, and in any event a house can always be sold for cash.
"I Payments on a mortgage can be broken down into two components: interest and
reduction of principal. Reduction of principal, or increases to equity, are in effect a form of
savings, since they increase the debtor's net worth. But interest payments are not a form of
savings since they leave the principal amount unaffected. The present deduction, IRC
§§ 163(a), 163(h)(1)-163(h)(3), applies only to interest, yet allowing a deduction for reduc-
tions of principal makes more sense if the congressional objective is to encourage savings.
150 See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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cult to justify. Such protection creates moral hazard problems, es-
pecially with respect to pension assets which the debtor controls. 151
However, changing preferences seem to provide a general justifica-
tion for restrictions on the alienability of pension wealth.1 2 Al-
though preference change does not necessarily eliminate moral
hazard concerns, it suggests that legislators should address moral
hazard issues with narrowly tailored tools, in order to accommo-
date paternalistic concerns. In this light, the distinction between
pension assets which individuals control and those which they do
not control seems overly broad, since bankruptcy law contains nu-
merous more finely-tuned protections against fraudulent
conveyances. 5 3
B. Mandatory Savings Plans
Though it is too early to know which of the two is more impor-
tant, there is evidence for the existence of both time-dependent
and situational preference change. Yet our understanding of each
phenomenon is nowhere near the point where the exact effects of
any given subsidy level or precommitment policy can be even
roughly estimated. Perhaps more importantly, the actual work-
place is likely to contain a mixture of impatients, impulsives, and
deliberates. An incentive-based plan will have different effects on
each of these groups. Unlike incentive programs, a mandatory sav-
ings plan will increase savings in a predictable way, regardless of
why or how much preferences change,15 4 and deserves serious con-
sideration. A surprisingly high number of observers take seriously
the possibility of a mandatory plan as a substitute either for Social
11 See notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
152 This has been pointed out by Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bank-
ruptcy Law 232-43 (Harvard, 1986).
S See, for example, 11 USC § 548. Jackson supports the bankruptcy exemption for a
broad range of pension assets, including Keogh plans. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law at 262-64 (cited in note 152). His argument seems to depend more on his
collective action theory of bankruptcy law than on his paternalistic justification of the policy
of discharge. Since Keogh plans cannot be reached by creditors individually, he suggests,
there is no collective action problem and therefore no reason to include these assets in the
estate. Id at 261. He does not address the more general question of whether the non-bank-
ruptey protection from individual creditors is justified.
I" If consumers are strategic, though, it may not be sufficient to require savings in the
difference between the amount the individual would have saved and the amount he ought to
save. Strategic consumers may offset marginal increments to savings by reducing the volun-
tary component of savings.
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Security or for voluntary employer sponsored pensions.155 The key
point of contention with respect to such a plan is whether it should
be implemented through eniployers,'15 through government, 57 or
through private financial intermediaries.158 Each of these alterna-
tives has problems. Reliance on employer plans is problematic be-
cause not all employers are well situated to make long-term con-
tracts and complex financial decisions. Even those skeptical of the
power of the market may be dismayed by a government-run plan
with a budget of over a trillion dollars, the magnitude of the pre-
sent private pension system. But the proposed plans that would
make use of private financial intermediaries seem based on strong
assumptions about the reliability of individual choice, and view in-
creasing choice as an unalloyed good. 59 The problems associated
with financial intermediaries seem to be the most tractable. There
is no reason why financial intermediaries cannot assume a pater-
nalistic role as well as employers. To the extent that concerns
about individual choice center on investment decisions, the same
fiduciary requirements, funding rules, and insurance programs that
ERISA imposes on employers could be imposed on financial insti-
tutions. 60 To the extent that employers supervise such matters as
hardship withdrawals, a financial intermediary could provide the
benefits of supervised illiquidity just as easily.
CONCLUSION
The current system of retirement income security favors So-
cial Security and non-contributory employer pensions, two ar-
rangements that do not rely heavily on individual choice. This im-
plicit paternalism is difficult to justify using neoclassical consumer
theory, long the main tool of analysis in savings policy. But
lawmakers have been reluctant to adopt more choice-oriented ar-
rangements. Evidence from psychologists confirms their suspicion
that individuals may not always make long-term decisions in their
own best interest.
151 President's Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age'at 41-44 (cited in note
85); Bankman, 55 U Chi L Rev at 825-26 (cited in note 36); Wolk, 70 Va L Rev at 466-67
(cited in note 68).
151 President's Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age at 41-44 (cited in note
85).
17 Paul Starr, Social Security and the American Public Household, in Theodore R.
Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis 119, 143-48
(Princeton, 1988).
"' Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 210 (cited in note 4).
259 Id at 207-27.
160 ERISA §§ 301-308 (funding); §§ 401-414 (fiduciary); §§ 4001-4009 (insurance).
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The present system of pensions and Social Security advances
paternalistic aims in a haphazard way. To the extent that Congress
wishes to rely on incentives, it could broaden the tax preference by
imposing a uniform ceiling on the total of all subsidized assets
while incorporating paternalistic concerns through IRA reform. To
the extent that either private pensions or Social Security are re-
placed by a mandatory system, there is no need to rely either on
the government or on private employers to further paternalistic
goals. Congress can rely on financial intermediaries to obtain the
advantages of specialization and competition without impeding ei-
ther its ability to impose paternalistic restrictions on individual
conduct or its ability to regulate the behavior of the financial
intermediaries.
Of course, even if paternalistic policy could incontrovertibly
improve individual welfare, some would object on the grounds that
the right of autonomous individuals to make their own mistakes is
an end in itself. Though this argument has, in my view, some force,
it does not seem a sufficient basis for rejecting all varieties of pa-
ternalism. In the words of one of the great neoclassicals,
[t]he paternalistic ground for governmental activity is in
many ways the most troublesome to a liberal; for it involves
the acceptance of a principle-that some shall decide for
others-which he finds objectionable in most applications and
which he rightly regards as a hallmark of his chief intellectual
opponents .... Yet there is no use pretending that problems
are simpler than in fact they are. There is no avoiding the
need for some measure of paternalism. . . . There is no
formula that can tell us where to stop. We must rely on our
fallible judgment and, having reached a judgment, on our abil-
ity to persuade our fellow men that it is a correct judgment, or
their ability to persuade us to modify our views."e
1" Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 33-34 (Chicago, 1962). It must be added,
though, that Professor Friedman strenuously objects to paternalistic savings policy. Id at
189-90.
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